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Green Boardrooms?
BRETT MCDONNELL, HARI M. OSOFSKY, JACQUELINE PEEL & ANITA
FOERSTER
Corporate and securities law tools are increasingly being used to
address climate change. Disclosure of climate-related business risks and
shareholder proposals and engagement have grown in the United States and
globally, as have broader efforts to use these tools to address environmental
and social issues. Emerging fiduciary duty suits in other jurisdictions claim
that corporate boards have failed to monitor and manage climate-related
risks adequately. However, legal scholarship has failed to assess whether
these efforts are actually changing corporate behavior. This Article draws
on original interviews with corporate leaders and investors in the United
States and Australia to assess the effectiveness of corporate and securities
law tools in addressing climate change. It finds that while disclosures and
shareholder proposals related to climate change have been extensive, they
have not yet changed corporate behavior much, if at all. The Article
therefore proposes a multi-pronged approach to increase the future
effectiveness of disclosure, shareholder proposals and engagement, and
fiduciary duty. This study offers new insights into the old debate over how
corporations can and should be used to address societal problems.
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Green Boardrooms?
BRETT MCDONNELL,* HARI M. OSOFSKY,** JACQUELINE PEEL*** & ANITA
FOERSTER****
INTRODUCTION
In 2017, the shareholders of three major fossil fuel companies, including
ExxonMobil, approved proposals requiring that the companies produce
detailed reports concerning climate change and their businesses.1
Shareholders called for these analyses to incorporate the potential impact on
the companies of the Paris Climate Agreement’s goal of limiting global
warming to well below two degrees Celsius.2 In 2018, the Sustainability
Accounting Standards Board published a set of standards to guide voluntary
reporting on a wide range of topics, including climate change, with guidance
particularized to the needs of seventy-seven different industries.3
These are two examples among many of initiatives being undertaken in
the United States and around the world to use securities and corporate law
tools—disclosure, shareholder proposals and engagement, and fiduciary
*
Professor and Dorsey & Whitney Chair, University of Minnesota Law School; Director, Institute
for Law and Economics, University of Minnesota Law School. This research received funding support
from the Australian Research Council Discovery Project grant on “Devising a Legal Blueprint for
Corporate Energy Transition” (2016–20). We are grateful to Rebekkah Markey-Towler and Maggie
Kolcon for assistance with referencing for this Article and to numerous colleagues, in the United States
and Australia, who provided helpful comments and feedback on earlier drafts. We would particularly
like to thank David Barnden, Madison Condon, Katrina Fischer Kuh, Michael Gerrard, Joan Heminway,
Claire Hill, Rosemary Langford, Ann Lipton, John Matheson, Elizabeth Pollman, Ian Ramsay, Usha
Rodrigues, Paul Rubin, Hillary Sale, Omari Simmons, Michael Vanderbergh, Gina Warren, and the
participants in the 2020 AALS Environmental Law and Natural Resources and Energy Law Sections
Food, Environmental and Natural Resources Works in Progress Session and a Faculty Works in Progress
session at the University of Minnesota Law School.
**
Dean, Penn State Law and School of International Affairs; Distinguished Professor of Law,
Professor of International Affairs, Professor of Geography, The Pennsylvania State University.
***
Professor, University of Melbourne, School of Law, Australia; Director, Melbourne Climate
Futures and Associate Director of the Centre for Resources, Energy and Environmental Law.
****

Senior Lecturer, Department of Business Law and Taxation, Monash University, Australia.
Cydney Posner, Are Shareholder Proposals on Climate Change Becoming a Thing?, HARV. L.
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (June 21, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/06/21/areshareholder-proposals-on-climate-change-becoming-a-thing/ (discussing these three resolutions).
2
Article 2(1)(a) of the 2015 Paris Agreement calls on parties to hold global average temperature
rises “to well below 2℃ above pre-industrial levels” and to pursue efforts to contain temperature rises to
no more than 1.5 degrees Celsius. Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104 [hereinafter Paris Agreement].
3
Download SASB Standards, SASB, https://www.sasb.org/standards-overview/download-currentstandards/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2021). The Board is one of many organizations that has emerged to create
voluntary sustainability disclosure standards. Infra notes 110–14 and accompanying text.
1
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duty litigation—to pressure corporations to respond more quickly to the
challenges of climate change in their business plans and investments.4
Companies increasingly provide sustainability disclosures in their annual
reporting and on their websites, though the quality of the information varies.5
The number of shareholder proposals on climate change, and votes in
support of them, continue to grow.6 And lawsuits asserting fraud in
disclosure or a failure to monitor and manage climate change-related risks7
adequately have begun to emerge globally.8
These tools are not only being used to address climate change. That topic
is just one of a number of environmental and social issues9 that new
disclosure frameworks and shareholder proposals are targeting. Other
common issues include gender pay equity, workplace diversity, and political
and lobbying expenditures by corporations.10 The initiatives addressing
these issues form a new phase in a cycle of corporate governance debates
raising fundamental questions of corporate law:11 In whose interests should
4
Disclosure involves companies providing information about climate change risks and activities.
Shareholder proposals involve someone who has a share in the company bringing a proposal to be voted
on by shareholders demanding that the company be responsive to climate change. Fiduciary duty suits
claim that companies have a fiduciary duty to address the risks of climate change. For an analysis of
these tools, see generally Hari M. Osofsky, Jacqueline Peel, Brett McDonnell & Anita Foerster, Energy
Re-Investment, 94 IND. L.J. 595 (2019) [hereinafter Osofsky et al., Energy Re-Investment].
5
JIM COBURN & JACKIE COOK, CERES, COOL RESPONSE: THE SEC & CORPORATE CLIMATE
CHANGE REPORTING 11–12 (2014); SOL KWON, IRRC INST., STATE OF SUSTAINABILITY AND
INTEGRATED REPORTING 2018, at 33 (2018) [hereinafter KWON, STATE OF SUSTAINABILITY]; U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-20-530, PUBLIC COMPANIES: DISCLOSURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL,
SOCIAL, AND GOVERNANCE FACTORS AND OPTIONS TO ENHANCE THEM 18 (2020) [hereinafter PUBLIC
COMPANIES REPORT].
6
Press Release, Conf. Bd., In 2020, Companies Will Continue to Face Pressure to Diversify Their
Boards, Address Pay Gaps, and Expand Political Contribution Disclosure (Dec. 17, 2019),
https://conference-board.org/press/environmental-social-policies-of-corporations.
7
We use the term “climate change-related risks” or “climate risk” in this Article to refer to the two
principal categories of risk that climate change may pose for businesses that have been identified by the
Taskforce on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD): physical risks, i.e., risks posed by climate
change to the assets, operations, and supply chains of a company, and transition risks, i.e., risks
associated with the transition to a low-carbon economy, which can include risks due to new regulatory
requirements, potential litigation, technology change, or reputational or brand damage. TASK FORCE ON
CLIMATE-RELATED FIN. DISCLOSURES, FINAL REPORT: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON
CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES 5–6 (2017) [hereinafter TCFD, FINAL REPORT]. Our focus
in this Article is primarily on transition risk, as we are concerned with how companies are responding to
the challenge of transitioning business practices for a low-carbon economy.
8
Infra note 299 and accompanying text.
9
Along with governance issues, these sorts of issues are frequently referred to as ESG matters.
PUBLIC COMPANIES REPORT, supra note 5, at 1. We will also frequently use the term “sustainability” to
cover the range of environmental and social topics currently being addressed in corporate governance circles.
10
Marc Treviño, 2019 Proxy Season Review: Part 1—Rule 14a-8 Shareholder Proposals, HARV.
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (July 26, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/07/26/2019proxy-season-review-part-1-rule-14a-8-shareholder-proposals/.
11
C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical Retrospective
for the Twenty-First Century, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 77, 77–78 (2002); Brett McDonnell, The Corrosion
Critique of Benefit Corporations 6–9 (U. Minn. L. Sch. Working Paper, Paper No. 19-24, 2019),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3450747.
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corporations be governed? How can we ensure that corporations best
advance the public good?12 However, amid all this activity and debate, the
critical question remains of whether this new activism is actually changing
corporate behavior.
This Article analyzes whether corporate and securities law can impact
corporate behavior with respect to climate change, drawing on original
interviews with corporate managers, investors, regulators, and other relevant
stakeholders in the United States and Australia.13 Through the interviews,
we sought a deeper understanding of how different actors perceive
climate-related uses of securities law tools and how companies are
responding. This included an effort to understand how, if at all, voluntary
disclosure and shareholder proposals and engagement have succeeded so far
at getting companies to address climate change-related risks.14
Our findings indicate these corporate and financial law initiatives have
not yet had a significant impact on underlying corporate behavior in ways
that substantively affect the allocation of resources and capital to address
climate change.15 However, those interviewed generally accept that even
under corporate law models focused on enhancing long-term shareholder
value (rather than considering other key stakeholders and the general
public), companies will need to pay greater attention to policy issues such
as climate change that are likely to have serious effects on financial
performance.16 Importantly, compared to the situation just five years ago,
many more companies and investors in both countries now understand
climate change to pose financial risks for businesses.17
Based on these findings, this Article proposes pathways for enhancing
the effectiveness of corporate and financial law tools.18 Australia provides a
particularly helpful comparative example for the United States in developing
these strategies because of its legal, socio-political, and economic
similarities. Drawing from the interviews and evolving use of the tools in
practice, this Article considers how they could be used more effectively. In
doing so, it recognizes the ongoing debate in corporate law about whether
corporations should focus only on enhancing value for their shareholders or
also consider other stakeholders and the general public.19 This Article argues
that even if a model focused on enhancing long-term shareholder value is
12

Infra Section I.A.
A total of thirty-eight interviews were undertaken, fourteen with stakeholders in the United States
and twenty-four with stakeholders in Australia. Additional details of different groups of participants in
the interviews are below. Infra notes 99–100 and accompanying text. A separate online appendix
provides further information on the interview methodology and analysis.
14
Infra notes 99–100
15
Infra Parts II–IV.
16
Infra Parts II–IV.
17
Infra Parts II–IV.
18
Infra Part V.
19
Infra Section I.A.
13
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not ideally suited to addressing problems like climate change, working
within its structure—while exploring longer-term reform—is most likely to
be effective in our current political environment.20 For each tool, we outline
what truly deep reform to create stakeholder-focused corporations might
look like, but also suggest more modest reforms within the prevailing
long-term shareholder value paradigm that have better prospects of success,
while nudging corporations in a more stakeholder-focused direction.
In the case of disclosure, a stakeholder focus would suggest
comprehensive new mandatory disclosure rules,21 along the lines of what
has emerged in the European Union (EU),22 while more modest reform
would entail the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) mandating
more specific disclosure of items related to climate change that have a
material impact on financial results and adopting one of the new private
standards for disclosure to provide greater uniformity.23
Regarding shareholder actions and engagement, a stakeholder focus
would empower persons with environmental expertise at the board level or
through advisory councils, while modest reform would bring SEC treatment
of proposals concerning greenhouse gas emissions and Department of Labor
guidance on the duty of retirement plan fiduciaries back to its approach
under the Obama Administration. We also recommend a variety of types of
20

Infra Part V.
See Ann M. Lipton, Not Everything Is About Investors: The Case for Mandatory Stakeholder
Disclosure, 37 YALE J. ON REGUL. 499, 503 (2020) (recommending a legally mandated disclosure system
for large companies, which would disclose financial information as well as information regarding
corporate governance, environmental impact, labor relationships, and consumer protection); see also Jill
E. Fisch, Making Sustainability Disclosure Sustainable, 107 GEO. L.J. 923, 928 (2019) (discussing the
2014 EU Directive on the Disclosure of Non-Financial and Diversity Information that requires specific
sustainability disclosures); Cynthia A. Williams & Jill E. Fisch, Petition to SEC for Rulemaking on
Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) Disclosure, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE
(Oct. 9, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/10/09/petition-to-sec-for-rulemaking-on-environmen
tal-social-and-governance-esg-disclosure/ (petitioning the SEC to engage in notice and comment rulemaking regarding disclosure rules for environmental, social and governance concerns).
22
The EU’s Non-Financial Reporting Directive requires large undertakings across the EU to
include a non-financial statement in the management report containing information on environmental,
social and employee, human rights, and bribery and anti-corruption related issues. Council Directive
2014/95, art. 6, 2014 O.J. (L 330) 1, 2–3 (EU). In June 2017, the European Commission published nonbinding guidelines on non-financial reporting to help companies provide high quality disclosure of
environmental, social, and governance-related information. Council Directive 2017/4234, arts. 1–2, 2017
O.J. (C 215) 1, 2–3 (EC). Further, in June 2019, the European Commission published non-binding
guidelines specifically on reporting climate-related information. The guidelines were developed as part
of the European Commission’s 2018 Action Plan on Financing Sustainable Growth, which aims to foster
sustainable investment, manage financial risks associated with climate change and other environmental
and social problems, and encourage transparent and long-term focused financial activity. The guidelines
supplement the existing 2014 Directive and non-binding guidelines, and they integrate the
recommendations of the TCFD. Council Directive 2019/4490, art. 1, 2019 O.J. (C 209) 1, 2–3 (EC).
23
See supra note 3 and accompanying text. The SEC could require issuers to either comply with
those standards or explain why they are not material for their business. Climate change disclosure should
include analysis of how world governments responding to a two degree Celsius or lower scenario as
required by the Paris Agreement would affect the disclosing company. See infra Part V.
21
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shareholder proposals that climate change activists may want to pursue,
some of which are already being tried in the United States and Australia but
could be expanded, and others of which are new suggestions based on our
interview findings.24
With respect to fiduciary duty, we note the immense obstacles that a
breach of duty climate change suit faces under governing law, but also draw
attention to the emergence of such suits in other countries and comment on
their potential application in a U.S. context. Australia provides a pertinent
comparison here with authoritative legal opinions,25 endorsed by Australian
national regulators,26 predicting that litigation against directors for failure to
consider climate-related risk “is likely to be only a matter of time.”27
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides conceptual framing for
the rest of the Article by situating the use of corporate and financial law to
address climate change within debates in both corporate and environmental
law over the role of corporations. It also introduces the value of comparing
the United States and Australia in this context. Parts II through IV review
legal and institutional developments and present our interview results and
comparisons with Australia for each tool, with Part II covering disclosure,
III covering engagement, and IV covering fiduciary duty. Part V provides
suggestions for reforms.
I. THE ROLE OF CORPORATE AND SECURITIES LAW IN ADDRESSING
CLIMATE CHANGE
In the past decade or so, the shape of corporate governance for U.S.
24
Useful proposals include limits on lobbying and political spending, requiring at least one director
with relevant environmental expertise, and requiring a more elaborate and formalized process for
consulting with environmental, community, and other stakeholder groups on climate change, as well as
other sustainability issues. See infra Section III.B.
25
See NOEL HUTLEY & SEBASTIAN HARTFORD DAVIS, CTR. FOR POL’Y DEV. & FUTURE BUS.
COUNCIL, CLIMATE CHANGE AND DIRECTOR’S DUTIES: MEMORANDUM OF OPINION (2016) [hereinafter
HUTLEY & HARTFORD DAVIS, 2016 MEMORANDUM], https://cpd.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/L
egal-Opinion-on-Climate-Change-and-Directors-Duties.pdf (considering the likelihood of physical
“climate change risks” and concluding that such risks would likely be foreseeable in litigation against a
company director); NOEL HUTLEY & SEBASTIAN HARTFORD DAVIS, CTR. FOR POL’Y DEV, CLIMATE
CHANGE AND DIRECTORS’ DUTIES: SUPPLEMENTARY MEMORANDUM OF OPINION (2019) [hereinafter
HUTLEY & HARTFORD DAVIS, 2019 MEMORANDUM], https://cpd.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/
Noel-Hutley-SC-and-Sebastian-Hartford-Davis-Opinion-2019-and-2016_pdf.
26
See, e.g., John Price, Comm’r, Austl. Sec. & Invs. Comm’n, Keynote Address at the Centre for
Policy Development: Financing a Sustainable Economy (June 18, 2018) (encouraging directors to lead
corporate governance reform to manage issues like climate change and noting that “directors would do
well to carefully consider the memorandum of opinion by Noel Hutley QC and Sebastian Hartford Davis
on climate change and directors duties . . . that, in our view, the opinion appears legally sound and is
reflective of our understanding of the position under the prevailing case law in Australia in so far as
directors’ duties are concerned”); Sean Hughes & Cathie Armour, Comm’rs, Austl. Sec. & Invs.
Comm’n, Address at ANU Climate Update (Feb.–Mar. 2019) (highlighting that directors who fail to
consider climate change risks now could be liable for breaching fiduciary duties in the future, again
favorably referring to the Hutley and Hartford Davis memorandum).
27
HUTLEY & HARTFORD DAVIS, 2016 MEMORANDUM, supra note 25, at para. 51.
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public corporations has altered dramatically, with initiatives surrounding
climate change playing a central role. Environmental, Social, and Governance
(ESG) activism has exploded as a major part of shareholder formal and
informal engagement.28 Multiple disclosure initiatives, focused on climate
change in particular and sustainability more generally, have expanded, with
sustainability reports becoming a standard part of corporate disclosure.29
These developments can be situated within a long-running and evolving
debate over the nature and purpose of business corporations. They also
reflect growing social and political recognition of the urgency of addressing
climate change. The developments described here are taking a particular
form within the United States, but they are occurring at public companies
around the world as well, with close parallels in similarly situated carbon
economies such as Australia.
This Part frames the rest of the Article by providing background on
debates within corporate governance and environmentalist circles concerning
the relationship between climate change and corporations. Section A
describes the evolving debate over the nature and purpose of United States
corporations. Section B explores why environmentalists concerned about
climate change have turned to using these securities and corporate law tools
and their varying views of them. Section C discusses features of company
law and governance in Australia and discusses some benefits from
comparing emerging practices in these two similarly situated countries.
A. The Corporate Governance Debate
The proper purpose of corporations, especially public corporations, and
the related question of to whom the fiduciary duties of corporate directors
and officers do and should run, have been a source of several cycles of public
and scholarly debate over the past century. The locus classicus of this debate
is an exchange between Adolf Berle and Merrick Dodd in the Harvard Law
Review in the early 1930s. Berle, a major New Deal figure and co-author of
the book first analyzing the separation of ownership and control in public
corporations, argued that directors and officers have a duty to protect the
interests of shareholders.30 Dodd countered that their duty runs to the
corporation more broadly, including the interests of other stakeholders and

28
Tamas Barko, Martijn Cremers & Luc Renneboog, Shareholder Engagement on Environmental,
Social, and Governance Performance 1 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. Finance Working Paper, Paper No.
509/2017, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2977219.
29
Hans B. Christensen, Luzi Hail & Christian Leuz, Adoption of CSR and Sustainability Reporting
Standards: Economic Analysis and Review 30 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 26169,
2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3439179.
30
A. A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (1931); A.
A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365, 1365
(1932).
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the public in general.31
The managerialist ideology of the fifties seemed to reflect a victory for
Dodd’s view, as Berle recognized.32 But in the seventies and eighties, Berle’s
shareholder conception became dominant. This was driven by the rise of
corporate raiders who launched hostile takeovers of poorly run businesses. A
wave of economists and legal scholars argued that a focus on shareholder
value would maximize the general welfare, at least within properly
functioning markets constrained by laws that countered major external
effects.33 Milton Friedman made the case most famously in a short and
elegant essay in the New York Times Magazine.34 Some scholars, though,
criticized this view, asserting the broader stakeholder vision of Dodd, and
many states adopted corporate constituency statutes that allowed directors
and officers to consider the interests of a variety of stakeholders, including
employees, creditors, customers, the environment, and the community.35
In the last two decades or so, two different sorts of shareholder activism
have embodied the tension between the shareholder and stakeholder
positions. On the one hand, a group of equity funds have followed a strategy
of identifying poorly performing companies, buying up a substantial share
position in them, and then pressuring management to take actions that the
activists believe will increase returns to shareholders.36 On the other hand is
the growth of the type of ESG activism discussed here, which addresses
31
E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145,
1147–48 (1932).
32
ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY: A NEW DEVELOPMENT IN AMERICAN
POLITICAL ECONOMY 8 (1959).
33
For some of these scholars’ insights, see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 36–38 (1991); Roberta Romano, A Cautionary Note on
Drawing Lessons from Comparative Corporate Law, 102 YALE L.J. 2021, 2031 (1993); Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 910–12 (2005); Mark J.
Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063,
2065 (2001); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance,
97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 550 (2003).
34
Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine--The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its
Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32.
35
For these criticisms, see Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 278 (1999); LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW
PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 104–05 (2012);
LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA’S NEWEST EXPORT 185–86 (2001);
KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS & PROGRESSIVE
POSSIBILITIES 228–29 (2006); David Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1013,
1013–14 (2013).
36
See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund
Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1093 (2015) (discussing whether interventions by activist hedge
funds have long-term detrimental effects on companies and shareholders and concluding that there is not
sufficient support for that theory); John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact
of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545, 553–54 (2016) (“[O]ur primary
concern is . . . with the possibility that the increasing rate of hedge fund activism is beginning to compel
corporate boards and managements to forego long-term investments (particularly in R&D) in favor of a
short-term policy of maximizing shareholder payout in the form of dividends and stock buybacks.”).
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environmental and social concerns.
Many proponents of ESG proposals and disclosure do not take a firm
position on the stakeholder side of the debate. Instead, they argue that a focus
on long-term shareholder value is consistent with, and indeed requires,
aggressive consideration of a variety of stakeholder interests. Typical of this
attempt to reconcile shareholders and stakeholders through a focus on the
long run are recent annual letters from Larry Fink, the CEO of BlackRock,
one of the Big Three family of mutual funds that has come to play a huge
role in the ownership of public corporations.37 In his recent letter to CEOs,
Fink specifically focused on climate change: “Our investment conviction is
that sustainability- and climate-integrated portfolios can provide better riskadjusted returns to investors. And with the impact of sustainability on
investment returns increasing, we believe that sustainable investing is the
strongest foundation for client portfolios going forward.”38
Fink is far from alone in this view. A large number of both investors and
companies have publicly taken similar positions. For an example of the view
expressed from the company side, consider this statement from the
Sustainability Report of Prologis, the highest-rated U.S. corporation on the
Global 100 Most Sustainable Companies list:39 “Our ESG program is good
business—benefiting our customers, investors, communities and employees.
Good ESG practices support our corporate commitment to enduring excellence
and advance our longstanding focus on exemplary customer service.”40
Why might a long-term focus help reconcile shareholder with
stakeholder interests? Several sorts of arguments are made in the context of
climate change. For many companies, climate change already is imposing
costs that require action, and for others it presents new business
opportunities. Another reason companies may need to focus on climate
change now is the threat of potentially much stronger regulation in the
relatively near future. Particularly for companies in energy and related
fields, which must make long-term investment decisions, the profitability of
those investments may shift dramatically with potential new regulations.41
Reputational concerns may also drive companies to consider
stakeholder interests.42 The more weight decisionmakers give to the future
37
Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2020 Letter to CEOs: A Fundamental Reshaping of Finance,
BLACKROCK, https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2020-larry-fink-ceo-letter (last
visited Mar. 21, 2021).
38
Id.
39
2019 Global 100 Results, CORP. KNIGHTS (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.corporateknights.com/r
eports/2019-global-100/2019-global-100-results-15481153/.
40
PROLOGIS, SUSTAINABILITY REPORT: A CULTURE OF RESILIENCE 4 (2017), https://prologis.get
bynder.com/m/10c8bf7b4af3adf1/original/Prologis_2017_SustainabilityReport_180530_FINAL.pdf.
41
See Madison Condon, Externalities and the Common Owner, 95 WASH. L. REV. 1, 40 (2020)
(discussing effects of long-term climate prediction assessments on investors).
42
See Claire A. Hill, Caremark as Soft Law, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 681, 694 (2018) [hereinafter Hill,
Caremark as Soft Law] (“[C]ompliance programs go far beyond what is needed to avoid lawbreaking,
and what directors do… goes far beyond what is needed to avoid liability, incorporating, among other
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profitability of the business, the more important reputation becomes. Many
consumers increasingly choose what companies to patronize, or not
patronize, based in part on their sense of how well those companies conform
to their personal values.43 Reputation with potential employees also matters
to many businesses, and highly-skilled employees may increasingly care
about climate change.44 However, even if all of the concerns above are
correct, one must also make a case for why managers are not already fully
taking them into account and hence why shareholder activism or litigation
could help, e.g., by addressing agency costs or market imperfections.
Engagement with stakeholders may also have informational benefits.
Scientists and other environmentalists who are deeply engaged in and
knowledgeable about the issue of climate change may be able to help
companies evaluate potential effects from climate change. Employees and
customers may have helpful ideas about how a company can reform its
operations. Local community leaders and organizations may help businesses
become aware of environmental impacts they are having in the places where
they are located.
A further effect, beyond a long-term focus on the returns of individual
companies, may reconcile shareholder and stakeholder interests. Many
institutional investors, the owners of most shares of public companies, are
highly diversified in their share ownership. They thus care about the effect
that the behavior of one company may have on the long-term profits of their
other portfolio companies. Even if a utility company may generate greater
profits by building more fossil fuel plants, if the resulting greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions hurt the profits of other companies more, a diversified
investor will not want to see those plants built. This portfolio effect helps
internalize major externalities such as GHG emissions.45
things, concerns about reputation, both theirs and their company's.”); Claire A. Hill, Marshalling
Reputation to Minimize Problematic Business Conduct, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1193, 1194, 1204 nn.43 & 45
(2019) (exploring corporate motivation for gaining reputational benefits).
43
LAWRENCE B. GLICKMAN, BUYING POWER: A HISTORY OF CONSUMER ACTIVISM IN AMERICA 3
(2009); Debbie Kasper, Contextualizing Social Practices: Insights into Social Change, in PUTTING
SUSTAINABILITY INTO PRACTICE: APPLICATIONS AND ADVANCES IN RESEARCH ON SUSTAINABLE
CONSUMPTION 41 (Emily Huddart Kennedy, Maurie J. Cohen & Naomi T. Krogman eds., 2015).
44
See, e.g., Fink, supra note 37 (“Attracting and retaining the best talent increasingly requires a
clear expression of purpose. With unemployment improving across the globe, workers, not just
shareholders, can and will have a greater say in defining a company’s purpose, priorities, and even the
specifics of its business. Over the past year, we have seen some of the world’s most skilled employees
stage walkouts and participate in contentious town halls, expressing their perspective on the importance
of corporate purpose. This phenomenon will only grow as millennials and even younger generations
occupy increasingly senior positions in business. In a recent survey by Deloitte, millennial workers were
asked what the primary purpose of businesses should be – 63 percent more of them said ‘improving
society’ than said ‘generating profit.’”).
45
Condon, supra note 41, at 43. A new nonprofit has been formed to advocate that investors with
diversified portfolios should take this effect into account, allowing them to advocate planet-friendly
policies. Our Story, S’HOLDER COMMONS, https://theshareholdercommons.com/about/#our-story (last
visited Mar. 22, 2021).
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For these reasons among others, the prevalent long-term value mantra
may go a long way to reconciling the interests of shareholders with other
stakeholders, including the interests of all persons in reducing the impact of
climate change. However, this consensus is challenged from opposing directions.
On one side are shareholder proponents who believe that ESG activism
has gone too far, and that much of the time following what ESG believers
propose would harm shareholder interests.46 These proponents can accept
that good business reasons may justify addressing climate risks but deny that
shareholders or courts can improve upon the judgment of managers. This
may be because ESG proponents know much less about what is going on
within a business than its directors and officers. Some shareholder
proponents also worry that some ESG proponents may be using the
long-term mantra to hide the true motivation of their agenda, namely, to
co-opt the mechanisms of corporate governance to reduce climate change
even if doing so damages the companies involved. These shareholder
proponents go back to the gospel of Milton:47 if GHG emissions are
imposing major external effects on the world, the proper response is with
legislation to stop it, such as a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade program.
A related criticism is that internal power remains focused on
shareholders, who are the sole constituents who elect the board and have the
power to sue over fiduciary duty violations. Director and officer
compensation also remain focused on shareholder value, and the prospects
of officers are naturally tied to the economic success of their business. All
that means that we should expect directors and officers to remain tied to the
interests of shareholders. Most other constituencies have both no power and
also very limited knowledge about the operations of most businesses. Insofar
as businesses spotlight the interests of others, we should expect it to be
mostly for show.48
46
Some have taken to direct counteraction against climate change shareholder action. See About,
BURN MORE COAL, https://burnmorecoal.com/ (describing themselves as “a pro-coal electric utility
shareholder activist group dedicated to promoting the increased use of coal as a fuel for electricity
generation”); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Purpose in a Populist Era 1, 7 (UCLA Sch. of
L., Law & Econ. Rsch. Paper No. 18-09, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3
237107 (explaining the populist perspective on corporate activist policies).
47
Friedman, supra note 34, at 33.
48
The former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, Leo E. Strine, Jr., has argued that this
concentration of corporate power on shareholders alone is the main reason why we should expect the
duty of directors to run to shareholders. Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a ClearEyed Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General
Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 772 (2015); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle
with the Idea That For-Profit Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 147–48 (2012).
Note, Strine’s personal opinions do not necessarily coincide with this existing legal structure. He has
advocated various reforms to increase protection for employees in corporate governance. See generally
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Fair and Sustainable Capitalism: A Comprehensive Proposal to Help
American Workers, Restore Fair Gainsharing Between Employees and Shareholders, and Increase
American Competitiveness by Reorienting Our Corporate Governance System Toward Sustainable
Long-Term Growth and Encouraging Investments in America’s Future (Harv. L. Sch. Discussion Paper
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A different critique comes from the side of stakeholder proponents.
These proponents agree with the Friedmanite critique that corporations as
currently constituted are unfit to become much more aggressive in
addressing climate change. However, these stakeholder-side critics are
skeptical that legislative or regulatory responses will be forthcoming at the
scale and on a timeline that is adequate to the challenge. Governments are
captured by the very shareholder-centered companies that are causing the
problem, and even if they had the will, they lack the resources necessary to
enforce rules adequately were they able to enact them. Addressing climate
change thus requires an enormous voluntary mobilization by businesses, but
current corporations will not mobilize nearly actively enough. Corporations
must therefore themselves be reformed, in their purposes, duties, and power
structure, so as to represent stakeholder interests adequately, including our
shared interest in addressing climate change.49
Thus, three basic positions have emerged regarding the role that
non-shareholder-focused interests, including the public interest in averting
climate change, should play in corporate decisionmaking. All positions aim
ultimately at improving social welfare, but they disagree as to what role
corporations should play in doing so. The shareholder wealth maximization
position that has dominated in the United States draws on the Smithian
invisible hand idea:50 within functioning markets, firm profit maximization
should maximize social welfare, with legal intervention as needed to address
externalities that may make prices inadequate signals of true social costs.51
The stakeholder position holds that markets and legal interventions are not
enough, and that we need corporations to consciously pursue the general
good, not just profits.52 The long-term shareholder position tries to reconcile
the two extremes.53
B. The Environmental Debate
Just as a triad of positions have emerged among corporate governance
scholars regarding the proper role of companies in addressing issues of broad
public interest like climate change, a similar variation of opinion has arisen
No. 1018, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3461924 (proposing reforms to
corporate governance because corporations act in accordance with short-term goals and do not match
the needs of human investors).
49
See generally COMPANY LAW AND SUSTAINABILITY: LEGAL BARRIERS AND OPPORTUNITIES
(Beate Sjåfjell & Benjamin J. Richardson eds., 2015) (canvassing ideas and proposals for furthering
sustainable companies with the final chapter proposing reform ideas for law to stimulate environmentally
sustainable companies).
50
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 456
(R. H. Campbell, A. S. Skinner & W. B. Todd eds., LibertyClassics ed. 1981).
51
Friedman, supra note 34, at 36.
52
Benjamin J. Richardson & Beate Sjåfjell, Capitalism, the Sustainability Crisis, and the Limitations
of Current Business Governance, in COMPANY LAW AND SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 49, at 1.
53
Fink, supra note 38.
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among environmental scholars and activists. Environmental scholars and
activists approach the issue not from the perspective of corporate
governance but rather from what strategies and laws are most effective to
deal with the looming climate crisis. The Paris Climate Agreement,
concluded in 2015, sets out a clear, science-based goal for what is necessary
to prevent dangerous climate change: holding global average temperature
rises to well below two degrees Celsius over pre-industrial levels and
pursuing efforts to keep temperature rises to no more than 1.5 degrees
Celsius.54 The premier climate science body globally—the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)—advised in a 2018
report that achieving this goal requires “rapid and far-reaching transitions”
across all economic sectors.55
For some environmental scholars and activists, corporations—
particularly fossil fuel corporations—are an obstacle to achieving this goal,
rather than a part of the solution. For example, some of the key leaders of
the “climate justice” movement, which has gained considerable momentum
in recent years, aim to reduce emissions through targeting major corporate
emitters of GHGs. Writing in 1999, the non-governmental organization
(NGO) CorpWatch described the ultimate aim of the then nascent climate
justice movement as “holding fossil fuel corporations accountable for the
central role they play in contributing to global warming.”56 In the early
2000s, U.S. lawsuits such as Kivalina and Comer featured plaintiffs
(unsuccessfully) seeking to attribute legal responsibility for climate change
harms to major oil companies.57 More recently, there has been another
eruption of climate justice lawsuits brought against both governments and
companies in the United States and in other countries.58
Those in the climate justice movement with this perspective have used
a variety of legal and campaigning strategies in their efforts to pursue
accountability for climate-related damage, ranging from large-scale protests

54

Paris Agreement, supra note 2, art. 2(1)(a).
IPCC, GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C: AN IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON THE IMPACTS OF GLOBAL
WARMING OF 1.5°C ABOVE PRE-INDUSTRIAL LEVELS AND RELATED GLOBAL GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSION PATHWAYS, IN THE CONTEXT OF STRENGTHENING THE GLOBAL RESPONSE TO THE THREAT OF
CLIMATE CHANGE, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, AND EFFORTS TO ERADICATE POVERTY 15 (Valérie
Masson-Delmotte, Hans-Otto Pörtner, Jim Skea, Panmao Zhai, Debra Roberts, Priyadarshi R. Shukla,
Anna Pirani, Roz Pidcock, Yang Chen, Elisabeth Lonnoy, Wilfran Moufouma-Okia, Sarah Connors,
Xiao Zhou, Tom Maycock, Melinda Tignor, Clotilde Péan, J.B. Robin Matthews, Melissa I. Gomis &
Tim Waterfield eds., 2018).
56
What is Climate Justice?, CORPWATCH (Nov. 1, 1999), https://corpwatch.org/article/whatclimate-justice.
57
Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 2012); Comer v.
Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049, 1055 (5th Cir. 2010).
58
Geetanjali Ganguly, Joana Setzer & Veerle Heyvaert, If at First You Don’t Succeed: Suing
Corporations for Climate Change, 38 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 841, 843 (2018); JOANA SETZER &
REBECCA BYRNES, GLOBAL TRENDS IN CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION: 2020 SNAPSHOT 27 (2020).
55
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and disruptive actions to legislative advocacy and litigation.59 In addition to
direct action against fossil fuel companies, some advocates and
organizations, such as 350.org, have encouraged institutional investors, like
universities, pension funds, churches, and other large charities, to divest
their shareholdings in fossil fuel companies.60 The movement has also
accused companies, particularly in the fossil fuel industry, of seeking to
undermine the findings of climate science and to block progressive
regulatory efforts to advance climate policy.61 Although some of these
advocates simply target fossil fuels, others argue more broadly that
unrestrained capitalism—represented by profit-driven corporate interests—
is to blame for the majority of GHG pollution.62
A second set of environmental scholars and advocates—agreeing with
the need to reduce corporate greenhouse gas emissions—has focused on the
need for corporate and financial law to be reformed to give needed weight
to the critical value of sustainability. These scholars generally identify with
the stakeholder approach in the corporate governance literature, and focus
on reforms to companies, as well as laws and principles governing
investment, that could incentivize a greater focus on ESG issues.63 This may
include reforms to corporate disclosure requirements to mandate disclosure
59
See environmental movements such as Extinction Rebellion, EXTINCTION REBELLION,
https://rebellion.global/about-us/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2020), and Fridays for Future, FRIDAYS FOR
FUTURE, https://fridaysforfuture.org/what-we-do/who-we-are/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2020). See also the
2015 Urgenda case, upheld on appeal to the Hague Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of the
Netherlands, in which the court found that the Dutch state had breached its duty of care by failing to
adopt sufficiently ambitious reduction targets. Rb.’s-Gravenhage 24 juni 2015, AB 2015, 336 m.nt. Ch.
W. Backes (Stichting Urgenda/Staat der Nederlanden). This finding was upheld on appeal and then again
by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands on the basis that the state had violated rights protected by the
European Convention on Human Rights by which the Netherlands is bound. HR 20 December 2019, NJ
2020, 41 m.nt. J. Spier (De Staat der Nederlanden/Stichting Urgenda). In the United States, the plaintiffs
in the Juliana case asserted that the federal government violated their constitutional and public trust
rights by burning fossil fuel. In 2016 Judge Aiken of the District of Oregon denied motions to dismiss
the action, finding that there is a fundamental right to a climate system capable of sustaining human life.
Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1250 (D. Or. 2016). But on January 17, 2020, a Ninth
Circuit panel by majority reversed Judge Aiken’s decision on the basis of a lack of standing. Juliana v.
United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1175 (9th Cir. 2020). The plaintiffs subsequently filed a petition for
rehearing en banc, which was denied. Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Juliana, 947 F.3d 1159 (No. 1836082), reh’g denied, 986 F.3d 1295 (9th Cir. 2021).
60
About 350, 350, https://350.org/about/#values (last visited Sept. 18, 2020); see also Neil
Gunningham, Building Norms from the Grassroots Up: Divestment, Expressive Politics, and Climate
Change, 39 LAW & POL’Y 372, 372 (2017) (discussing 350.org’s mission).
61
NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK M. CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT: HOW A HANDFUL OF SCIENTISTS
OBSCURED THE TRUTH ON ISSUES FROM TOBACCO SMOKE TO GLOBAL WARMING 6–7 (2010);
Gunningham, supra note 6060, at 381.
62
Richard Heede, Tracing Anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide and Methane Emissions to Fossil Fuel
and Cement Producers, 1854–2010, 122 CLIMATIC CHANGE 229, 238 (2014); Peter C. Frumhoff,
Richard Heede & Naomi Oreskes, The Climate Responsibilities of Industrial Carbon Producers, 132
CLIMATIC CHANGE 157, 166–67 (2015).
63
COMPANY LAW AND SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 49, at xvi; ELISA MORGERA, CORPORATE
ACCOUNTABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 20 (2009).
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of environmental risks such as climate change,64 all the way up to the
introduction of new corporate forms that allow a primary ESG-related
objective beyond the usual focus on shareholder profit.65
Like the convergence between shareholder and stakeholder approaches
described above, we also see the emergence of what might be termed a
“pragmatic middle” position on the role of companies in addressing climate
change in environmental scholarship and practice.66 Those adopting this
approach seek to persuade corporations, as they are currently configured, to
do more to address climate change on the basis that this can also serve
corporate interests where climate change poses material business risks.67 For
example, Professor Sarah Light’s recent article, The Law of the Corporation
as Environmental Law, argues that we should embrace corporate law
requirements as part of the “environmental law toolkit,” using these
nontraditional levers to encourage company action to address pressing
environmental issues, including climate change.68 Authors such as
Professors Michael Vandenbergh and Jonathan Gilligan in their book,
Beyond Politics: The Private Governance Response to Climate Change, take
an even more robust stance, arguing that private sector action on climate
change provides a promising alternative to waiting for governments to make
progress on the issue.69

64
See, e.g., Anita Foerster, Jacqueline Peel, Hari Osofsky & Brett McDonnell, Keeping Good
Company in the Transition to a Low Carbon Economy? An Evaluation of Climate Risk Disclosure
Practices in Australia, 35 CO. & SEC. L.J. 154, 154 (2017) (examining current disclosure practices related
to climate risks in Australia and suggesting reform options); Cary Di Lernia, Strange Bedfellows?
Climate Change, Carbon Risk, and the Regulation of Corporate Disclosure, 36 CO. & SEC. L.J. 221, 221
(2018) (discussing opportunities to improve disclosure of climate risks); Natalie Nowiski, Rising Above
the Storm: Climate Risk Disclosure and Its Current and Future Relevance to the Energy Sector, 39
ENERGY L.J. 1, 2 (2018) (discussing the lack of mandatory climate risk disclosure reporting in the United
States and recommending reform options).
65
Brett H. McDonnell, From Duty and Disclosure to Power and Participation in Social Enterprise,
70 ALA. L. REV. 77, 78 (2018) [hereinafter McDonnell, From Duty and Disclosure]; Brett H. McDonnell,
Benefit Corporations and Public Markets: First Experiments and Next Steps, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
717, 717 (2017); Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A Sustainable Form of Organization?,
46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 591 (2011).
66
The authors have articulated this view in previous work. See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky & Jacqueline
Peel, Energy Partisanship, 65 EMORY L.J. 695, 695 (2016) (discussing strategies for advancing
bipartisan action, economic alignment, and corporate action); Osofsky et al., Energy Re-Investment,
supra note 4, at 606 (analyzing strategies for shifting energy investment and encouraging energy
reinvestment); See also SARAH BARKER, COMMONWEALTH CLIMATE & L. INITIATIVE, DIRECTORS’
LIABILITY AND CLIMATE RISK: AUSTRALIA – COUNTRY PAPER 3 (2018) (acknowledging the material
risks of climate change and suggesting corporate options to address the issues); Sarah Barker, Mark
Baker-Jones, Emilie Barton & Emma Fagan, Climate Change and the Fiduciary Duties of Pension Fund
Trustees—Lessons from the Australian Law, 6 J. SUSTAINABLE FIN. & INV. 211, 211 (2016) (suggesting
that climate change should be considered a financial issue).
67
Sarah E. Light, The Law of the Corporation as Environmental Law, 71 STAN. L. REV. 137, 146 (2019).
68
Id. at 149.
69
MICHAEL P. VANDENBERGH & JONATHAN M. GILLIGAN, BEYOND POLITICS: THE PRIVATE
GOVERNANCE RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 3–4 (2017).
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Those working to advance this approach have a variety of perspectives
on corporations and on the appropriate strategy for deploying tools from this
“environmental toolkit.” This pragmatic middle position is sometimes held
in conjunction with some variation on the first two positions, with these
efforts treated as crucial complementary strategies given current partisan
political dynamics.70 For instance, some environmental groups embracing
this middle-ground position do so through an engagement-focused strategy
conducted in the shadow of the threat of litigation if companies do not step
up their game on climate change.71 A leading example is the U.K.-based
environmental NGO, ClientEarth, whose corporate and financial law
program includes efforts both to educate companies about climate business
risk and also to develop shareholder lawsuits against companies which fail
to monitor and manage these risks adequately.72
In addition, the “pragmatic middle” position is a nuanced one because
corporations and investors vary significantly in how they approach the
problem of climate change and interact with the environmental community.
Even within the fossil fuel industry, companies have positioned themselves
differently with respect to how the energy transition needed interacts with
their bottom line. This variation is particularly strong among oil and gas
companies, many of which market natural gas as a transitional fuel and have
invested significantly in renewable energy.73 Some fossil fuel companies
have been actively involved in corporate climate change efforts, including
sending representatives to the international climate change negotiations,
opposing the Trump Administration’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement,
and the Biden Administration’s rejoining it.74
70

Osofsky & Peel, supra note 66, at 794.
Why the Law, CLIENTEARTH, https://www.clientearth.org/how-we-work/why-the-law/ (last
visited Mar. 24, 2021).
72
Id.
73
Analysts have highlighted that European oil and gas companies are outpacing their U.S. rivals.
See, e.g., Ron Bousso, Big Oil Spent 1 Percent on Green Energy in 2018, REUTERS (Nov. 11, 2018, 7:06
PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-oil-renewables/big-oil-spent-1-percent-on-green-energy-in2018-idUSKCN1NH004 (explaining European companies’ expenditures on renewable efforts); Timothy
Abington & Kelly Gilblom, Shell Leads Big Oil in the Race to Invest in Clean Energy, BLOOMBERG
(Sept. 4, 2019, 6:11 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-09-04/shell-leads-big-oil-inthe-race-to-invest-in-clean-energy-tech (“European majors closed seven times as many deals with
renewable-electricity and storage companies as their U.S. counterparts since 2010.”).
74
See, e.g., Thousands of Big Energy Reps at UN Climate Talks: Monitor, FRANCE24 (June 21,
2019, 1:50 AM), https://www.france24.com/en/20190621-thousands-big-energy-reps-un-climate-talksmonitor (“The International Emissions Trading Group (IETA), which counts among its members energy
giants such as BP, Chevron and Shell, has sent 1,817 delegates to COPs and inter-sessional meetings
since 2000, according to the attendees list.”); Rebecca Elliott & Bradley Olson, Oil Companies, Pushed
to Address Climate, Disagree on How, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 22, 2019, 5:30 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/oil-companies-pushed-to-address-climate-disagree-on-how-11569144602
(reporting that ExxonMobil, Shell, and BP will participate in U.N. climate talks); Alanna Petroff, Big
Business Wants Trump to Stick with Paris Climate Accord, CNN (May 29, 2017, 12:29 PM),
https://money.cnn.com/2017/05/29/news/trump-paris-climate-change-business/ (explaining that Chevron,
ExxonMobil, and other large companies opposed President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Paris
71
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The Paris Agreement negotiations and responses to President Trump and
President Biden’s rejoining exemplify this complexity. Those negotiations
featured an unprecedented level of engagement with business interests,
including some fossil fuel companies and investors in them.75 Many of these
companies and investors, including energy companies, opposed President
Trump’s Paris Agreement withdrawal, and committed—together with other
stakeholders—to action as part of the We Are Still In initiative.76 Additional,
parallel private sector initiatives, such as the We Mean Business Coalition77
and the G20 Taskforce on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD),78
have continued to gain momentum following the Paris Agreement. Over 300
businesses and investors from the We Mean Business Coalition wrote an
open letter to President Biden in April 2021 praising his rejoining the Paris
Agreement, and calling for a national “target of cutting GHG emissions by at
least 50% below 2005 levels by 2030.”79 Both prominently feature corporate
and investor stakeholders seeking to embed the management of climate
change-related business risks as a matter of standard practice for companies.80
These initiatives are complemented by efforts of shareholder advocacy
and investor groups in the United States and other countries that advocate
for corporate leadership on sustainability issues, often based on a program
of shareholder activism and engagement with companies. A prominent U.S.
example is Ceres, which describes its purpose as follows:
Ceres is a sustainability nonprofit organization working with
the most influential investors and companies to build
leadership and drive solutions throughout the economy. Through
powerful networks and advocacy, Ceres tackles the world’s

Agreement); Laura Hurst, Shell CEO Hopeful Biden Will Speed Up Climate Change Fight, HOUSTON
CHRON. (Dec. 4, 2020) (calling President Biden rejoining the Paris Agreement a “pretty good start”).
75
Ilario D’Amato, Marc Bolland, CEO, M&S: COP21 a “Turning Point” Thanks to Business
Engagement and Demand, CLIMATE GRP. (Dec. 6, 2015), https://www.theclimategroup.org/what-wedo/news-and-blogs/cop21-a-turning-point-thanks-to-business-engagement-and-demand-marc-bollandceo-mands.
76
Businesses & Investors, WE ARE STILL IN, https://www.wearestillin.com/businesses-investors
(last visited Sept. 24, 2020); Richard Luscombe, Top US Firms Including Walmart and Ford Oppose
Trump on Climate Change, GUARDIAN (Dec. 1, 2017, 11:32 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/enviro
nment/2017/dec/01/trump-climate-change-paris-withdrawal-ford-walmart.
77
What We Do, WE MEAN BUS. COAL., https://www.wemeanbusinesscoalition.org/about/ (last
visited Sept. 24, 2020).
78
About the Task Force, TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FIN. DISCLOSURES, https://www.fsbtcfd.org/about/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2020).
79
We Mean Business Coalition, Press Release, 310 Businesses and Investors Support U.S. Federal
Climate Target in Open Letter to President Biden, https://www.wemeanbusinesscoalition.org/press-release
/businesses-investors-support-u-s-federal-climate-target-open-letter-president-biden/ (Apr. 13, 2021).
80
See, e.g., TCFD, FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 1–2 (responding to calls from a range of financial
market participants for decision-useful, climate-related information, the industry-led Task Force
developed a framework for climate-related financial disclosures).
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biggest sustainability challenges, including climate change, water
scarcity and pollution, and inequitable workplaces.81
Those working in this middle-ground space thus include a wide array of
actors, from environmental organizations and individual advocates, to
corporations and investors, and non-profit organizations.
Accordingly, we see three—at times interrelated—positions developing
in the environmental community on the role that companies should play in
averting dangerous climate change. All positions aim ultimately at achieving
climate change mitigation goals, such as the Paris Agreement’s two degrees
target, and advocate for the need for corporate behavioral change. But there
is disagreement as to how to position corporations in that effort. The first
position treats corporations as actors—and for some taking this position, bad
actors—who need to be held accountable, including through litigation, for
their major role in harming the global climate system. The other positions
see a role for corporations as part of the solution to climate change.
According to the second position, this will require an agenda of law and
corporate governance reform to align corporate interests more closely with
broader environmental stakeholder interests. Under the third position, a
middle-ground approach using existing law is preferable, at least in the
short-term, as a way of encouraging corporate action to address climate
change, based on the threats it poses to businesses’ financial bottom-lines.
None of these positions are necessarily in conflict with one another,
other than at the extremes, such as between those who oppose entirely
working with corporations and those who are engaging corporations in
developing solutions to climate change. Many advocates support a
multi-pronged approach, which might include corporate accountability
litigation, legal reform, and collaborative work with corporations. After
exploring current practices in Parts II through IV, we will explore what such
an inclusive multi-pronged approach might look like in Part V.
C. The Value of a Comparative Conceptual Approach
Because climate change is a transnational and international problem, the
Article takes a comparative approach. With a particular focus on Australia,
the Article’s assessment provides recommendations so that the United States
can benefit from what has been tried in other places. Other countries have
also faced the challenge of how to address the role of private sector companies
in addressing public interest issues, such as climate change. The different
positioning of viewpoints across the corporate governance and environmental
communities described above is replicated in the scholarship and practice of
a number of other developed countries.82 Some countries, particularly in
81

About Us, CERES, https://www.ceres.org/about-us (last visited Sept. 24, 2020).
See, e.g., Beate Sjåfjell, Why Law Matters: Corporate Social Irresponsibility and the Futility of
Voluntary Climate Change Mitigation, 8 EUR. CO. L. 56, 56 (2011) (detailing the Corporate Social
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Europe, are developing far-reaching corporate law reforms that carve out a
central role for ESG considerations in corporate governance.83 However, in
others, no firm position has been reached on corporate governance and climate
change, paralleling the U.S. approach. In this respect, Australia provides a
useful comparison to the United States for three key reasons.
First, like the United States, Australia has a carbon-driven economy. It
is highly dependent on fossil-fuel exports as a principal source of income,84
and has electricity-generation and transportation systems dominated by
fossil fuel energy sources.85 Moreover, of the top 300 companies listed on
the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX), over half have high exposure to
climate risk.86 These factors make regulation to address climate change a
Responsibility debate in the EU); Lisa Benjamin & Stelios Andreadakis, Corporate Governance and
Climate Change: Smoothing Temporal Dissonance to a Phased Approach, 40 BUS. L. REV. 146, 146
(2019) (advocating for a phased approach to climate risk disclosures in the UK); Janet Dine, Corporate
Regulation, Climate Change and Corporate Law: Challenges and Balance in an International and
Global World, 26 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 173, 174 (2015) (comparing UK and Albanian approaches to
directors duties and detailing effects on corporate responsibility resulting from Albanian law that allows
lifting of corporate veils); Benjamin J. Richardson, Putting Ethics into Environmental Law: Fiduciary
Duties for Ethical Investment, 46 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 243, 244–45 (2008) (discussing potential
environmental regulation approaches for Canada, the U.S., and Europe stemming from socially
responsible investment).
83
See supra note 22; Communication from The Commission to the European Parliament, the
European Council, the Council, the European Central Bank, the European Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Action Plan: Financing Sustainable Growth, at 1, COM
(2018) 97 final (Aug. 3, 2018) (detailing the European Commission’s action plan to comply with the
goals set by the Paris Agreement). For a broader overview of these reforms, see Sustainable Finance,
EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/banking-and-finance/sustainable-finan
ce_en (last visited Mar. 25, 2021). An example of this type of reform is the French Energy Transition
Law, introduced in 2015, which requires listed companies to report on financial risks linked to the effects
of climate change and the measures that the company takes to reduce such effects by implementing a
low-carbon strategy in all components of its business. AMY MASON, WILL MARTINDALE, ALYSSA HEATH
& SAGARIKA CHATTERJEE, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INV., FRENCH ENERGY TRANSITION LAW:
GLOBAL INVESTOR BRIEFING 7 (2016) [hereinafter FRENCH ENERGY TRANSITION LAW].
84
Australia’s mining sector accounted for 8.7% of the country’s GDP in 2019 and 28% of its GDP
growth in 2019. Resource and energy commodity exports are forecasted to earn $299 billion in 2019–20.
OFF. OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, RESOURCES AND ENERGY QUARTERLY 4, 6 (2020). The Australia
Institute analysis categorizes Australia as the world’s third largest fossil fuel exporter. TOM SWANN, THE
AUSTL. INST., HIGH CARBON FROM A LAND DOWN UNDER: QUANTIFYING CO2 FROM AUSTRALIA’S
FOSSIL FUEL MINING AND EXPORTS 2 (2019).
85
In 2017–18, “fossil fuels (coal, oil and gas) accounted for 94 per cent of Australia’s primary
energy mix.” DEP’T OF THE ENV’T & ENERGY, AUSTRALIAN ENERGY UPDATE 2019, at 8 (2019). Fossil
fuels contributed to 81% of total electricity generation in 2018, with coal accounting for 60% of total
generation and gas-fired generation representing 19% of total generation. Id. at 28. Further, transport
constituted the largest consumer of energy, with road and air transport accounting for 71% and 20% of
energy consumption, respectively. Id. at 13.
86
MKT. FORCES, OUT OF LINE, OUT OF TIME 2 (2019). For energy and electricity-generation
companies, climate risk is primarily transitional risk associated with the potential for increasing
regulation of carbon emissions and the risk of stranded assets. However, Australian companies also have
significant exposure to physical climate risk, given the country’s hot, dry climate and particular
vulnerability to climate change-fuelled extreme weather events like heatwaves, wildfires and flooding.
See Narelle Hooper, 3 Major Areas of Concern for Climate Risk in Australia, AUSTL. INST. CO. DIR.
(May 1, 2019), https://aicd.companydirectors.com.au/membership/company-director-magazine/2019back-editions/may/climate-risk (detailing the risks that climate change poses for companies).
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central issue of economic importance and corporate concern in Australia, as
in the United States.
Second, Australia offers a socio-political and cultural context that is perhaps
the most closely aligned with the United States of any country worldwide. This
is particularly so when it comes to the issue of climate change, which has
produced strong partisan divides and national legislative paralysis similar to that
seen in the United States.87 Australia briefly experimented with a carbon tax in
the early 2010s,88 which was effective in lowering energy-related GHG
emissions,89 but this was repealed by an incoming conservative government.90
In the aftermath, national climate regulatory proposals have stalled,91 leading
environmental activists to focus on other avenues for achieving progress,
including changes in corporate behavior.
Finally, Australia shares a similar corporate and securities law
framework to the United States, based in the Anglo-American corporate law
tradition.92 Although relevant laws on disclosure, shareholder proposals, and
directors’ duties are by no means identical,93 the general structure of laws
and the dominance of the shareholder wealth-maximization view are shared
by both the United States and Australia.94 This means that efforts to use
87
Hari M. Osofsky & Jacqueline Peel, The Grass is Not Always Greener: Congressional
Dysfunction, Executive Action, and Climate Change in Comparative Perspective, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
139, 140 (2016).
88
Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) (Austl.), as repealed by Clean Energy Legislation (Carbon Tax
Repeal) Act 2014 (Cth) (Austl.).
89
For analysis on the efficacy of the carbon tax, see Marianna O’Gorman & Frank Jotzo, Impact of
the Carbon Price on Australia’s Electricity Demand, Supply and Emissions 1 (Austl. Nat’l Univ.,
Working Paper 1411, 2014). For a broader review of Australia’s climate change law over time, see Ilona
Millar & Sophie Whitehead, Climate Change Law in Australia—A History and the Current State of Play,
92 AUSTL. L.J. 756, 756 (2018).
90
Clean Energy Legislation (Carbon Tax Repeal) Act 2014 (Cth) (Austl.).
91
AUSTL. PANEL OF EXPERTS ON ENV’T L., CLIMATE LAW: TECHNICAL PAPER 5, 11 (2017). There
is also more recent commentary on a possible “climate truce” following the COVID-19 pandemic.
Matthew Warren, Australian Politics Quietly Reaches a Truce in the Climate Wars, AUSTL. FIN. REV.
(July 6, 2020, 2:52 PM), https://www.afr.com/policy/energy-and-climate/australian-politics-quietlyreaches-a-truce-in-the-climate-wars-20200706-p559b4.
92
JOHN FARRAR, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE THEORIES, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 5 (3d. ed. 2008).
93
A key distinction is that the concept of “fiduciary duties” in Australia differs from that in the
United States, though there are duties owed by directors who are fiduciaries. However, not all such duties
are fiduciary duties. In the case of the duty of care, it is a common law duty and an equitable duty: See
ROBERT AUSTIN & IAN RAMSAY, FORD, AUSTIN & RAMSAY’S PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATIONS LAW
paras. 8.010.3, 8.320 (2019) (explaining the position in Australia). A similar position applies in other
common law countries, which generally treat loyalty as the only “fiduciary duty.” See Christopher M.
Bruner, Is the Corporate Director’s Duty of Care a “Fiduciary” Duty? Does It Matter?, 48 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1027, 1027–29 (2013) (noting that in the UK loyalty is the only fiduciary duty). In this
Article, we have used the term “fiduciary duties” simply for convenience in discussing relevant duties
under Australian law.
94
Malcolm Anderson, Meredith Jones, Shelley Marshall, Richard Mitchell & Ian Ramsay,
Shareholder Primacy and Directors’ Duties: An Australian Perspective, 8 J. CORP. L. STUD. 161, 162
(2008); Richard Mitchell, Anthony O’Donnell, Ian Ramsay & Michelle Welsh, Shareholder Protection
in Australia: Institutional Configurations and Regulatory Evolution, 38 MELBOURNE U.L. REV. 68, 94–
95 n.134 (2014).
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corporate law tools to shape corporate behavior on climate change in
Australia, as well stakeholders’ perception of the effectiveness of such efforts,
offer lessons for evolving practice in the United States, and vice versa.
As we describe further in Parts II and III below, legal requirements
regarding disclosure and shareholder proposals are generally more favorable
to addressing climate change issues in the United States than in Australia,
although greater access for investors to companies through informal
engagement avenues may obviate the need for the more confrontational
approach seen in the United States. Large institutional investors, such as
sovereign wealth funds and pension funds (including Australia’s substantial
“superannuation” funds), have made significant investments in the top-200
Australian listed companies (ASX200),95 with their concentrated
shareholding giving them significant sway with companies.96 In the context
of fiduciary duties, the legal positions of the United States and Australia are
reversed, with broader interpretations of relevant duties in Australia
potentially easing the pathway for potential litigation there.97 In addition,
while the volume of shareholder proposals in Australia is dwarfed by that in
the United States, interesting approaches are emerging around non-binding
advisory resolutions in more well-established investor-corporate engagement
activities that particularly focus on questions such as corporate lobbying and
membership of industry organizations with anti-climate regulatory
positions.98 As these practices continue to evolve, they could offer examples
of approaches that might also be pursued in U.S. shareholder activism.
This multi-pronged, comparative approach is not a panacea. No one has
yet found a politically realistic way to address climate change at the pace
that is needed to prevent major impacts, and corporate and financial law
cannot address this problem without other significant environmental and
energy law initiatives. Nonetheless, the Parts that follow provide an in-depth
assessment, grounded in original interview-based research, of current views
on the impact of these efforts to date, which provides a basis for assessing
how to make future strategies more effective.
II. DISCLOSURE
The following three Parts provide our review of current developments
in disclosure, shareholder proposals and engagement, and fiduciary duty
based on our interview findings in a comparative U.S.-Australian context.
95

JUSTIN ELLIS, UNDERSTANDING OWNERSHIP TRENDS IN AUSTRALIA: 2018 KEY INSIGHTS 6 (2018).
PARLIAMENTARY JOINT COMM. ON CORPS. & FIN. SERVS., CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY:
MANAGING RISK AND CREATING VALUE 65 (2006).
97
Barker, supra note 66, at 58–59.
98
The Australasian Centre for Corporate Responsibility (ACCR) maintains details of resolutions.
AUSTRALASIAN CTR. FOR CORP. RESP., https://www.accr.org.au/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2021); Australian
ESG Shareholder Resolutions, AUSTRALASIAN CTR. FOR CORP. RESP., https://accr.org.au/shareholderaction/resolution-voting-history/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2020).
96

2021]

GREEN BOARDROOMS?

357

Each Part examines current developments and then discusses existing
practices, drawing on qualitative interviews conducted with several dozen
stakeholders in the United States and Australia.99 Interviewees included
mostly persons who work for corporations and investors, although they also
included regulators, advocacy groups, and service providers. In the United
States, interview participants encompassed the following groups:
•

Listed companies (five interviews), drawn from the industry
sectors of utilities, financial, food, retail, and materials.
Interviews were undertaken with a corporate director, an
in-house counsel with a securities law focus, and
sustainability staff.

•

Asset owners (three interviews), including a public employee
pension fund, a union pension fund, and a charitable foundation.

•

Asset managers (four interviews), including two investment
funds with a focus on socially responsible investing and two
with a focus on index funds.

•

Investor and company service providers (two interviews).

•

Investor associations (one interview).

In Australia, interviews covered similar groups, including:
•

Corporate and financial sector regulators (two interviews).

•

Civil society advocacy groups engaging with corporate law
tools to influence company decisionmaking on energy
transition (two interviews).

•

Investor groups or associations (two interviews).

•

Investor service providers providing ESG analysis, proxy voting,
engagement and representation services (two interviews).

•

Listed ASX50 companies (seven interviews), drawn from the
industry sectors of energy, utilities and materials. Interviews
were undertaken with various company officers including
company secretaries, investment relations, and sustainability
staff.

•

Asset owners, with predominantly industry superfunds
(seven interviews). Interviews were conducted with in-house
ESG and investment analysts.

99
Interviews were conducted in the United States with a total of fourteen persons from August to
November of 2018. Interviews were conducted in Australia with a total of twenty-four persons from
February to August of 2018. All interviewees’ identities will be kept anonymous, except for the relevant
aspects of identity, listed above. Interviewees are identified numerically by country (e.g., US1, AUS1).
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Asset managers (two interviews), with fund managers
associated with the asset owners interviewed for the research.
Interviews were conducted with in-house ESG and
investment analysts.100

This Part focuses on disclosure, which is one of the main securities law
tools being used to promote a faster energy transition. In a previous Article,
we discussed several pathways by which disclosure could do so.101
Disclosure could provoke disinvestment from companies with higher GHG
emissions profiles to those with lower ones by revealing risks of the former
and opportunities of the latter. It could affect involvement in companies by
consumers and employees. Disclosure could also promote shifting of
resources within companies by affecting the focus of and information
available to corporate decisionmakers.102
U.S. companies whose shares trade publicly must engage in a variety of
required periodic disclosure, such as annual reports on Form 10-K and
quarterly reports on Form 10-Q.103 There are no specific requirements
concerning climate change-related disclosure, but a variety of required
disclosures may be implicated where climate change threatens to have a
material impact on the financial performance of a company. Companies may
also choose to disclose beyond what the securities laws require in other
documents, and now many do so for various sustainability matters. This first
Section reviews developments in mandatory and voluntary disclosure
surrounding climate change and presents results from our interviews
concerning the effects of these developments.104

100
In this Article we include insights from the Australian interviews, mainly as a comparison to the
U.S. findings. For a fuller analysis of the results of the Australian interviews, see generally Jacqueline
Peel, Anita Foerster, Brett McDonnell & Hari M. Osofsky, Governing the Energy Transition: The Role
of Corporate Law Tools, 36(5) ENV’T & PLAN. L.J. 459 (2019) and the authors report on this research
project: Jacqueline Peel, Hari Osofsky, Brett McDonnell, Anita Foerster & Rebekkah Markey-Towler,
Corporate Energy Transition: Legal Tools for Shifting Companies Towards Clean Energy Practices
(2020), available at https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/3500460/Corporate-EnergyTransition-Report.pdf (accessed April 13, 2021).
101
See generally Osofsky et al., Energy Re-Investment, supra note 4.
102
Id. at 649–52.
103
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq); 17 C.F.R. § 229.601 (2020).
104
In addition to the effects discussed below, one way that climate activists can use disclosure is
through enforcement actions. Most prominently, various state attorneys general have investigated the
reporting practices of ExxonMobil, and, in 2016, a shareholder class action was brought against that
company. Justin Gillis & Clifford Krauss, Exxon Mobil Investigated for Possible Climate Change Lies
by New York Attorney General, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/06/scien
ce/exxon-mobil-under-investigation-in-new-york-over-climate-statements.html; Ivan Penn, California
to Investigate Whether Exxon Mobil Lied About Climate-Change Risks, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2016, 3:00
AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-exxon-global-warming-20160120-story.html; SETZER &
BYRNES, supra note 58, at 21.
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A. Legal and Institutional Developments
In 2010, the SEC issued guidance on applying various reporting
requirements to risks connected to climate change.105 It included examples
covering both risks that the effects of climate change may have on company
assets and operations (so-called physical risks), and legal, market, and
reputational risks associated with how a company responds, or fails to
respond, to emerging rules and best practices that attempt to reduce GHG
emissions (so-called non-physical or transition risks).106
Early analysis of mandated reports following the 2010 SEC guidance
suggested that disclosure concerning climate change did increase, but the
disclosure by many companies remained brief and lacking in substance.107
A more recent analysis found that in 2018, about 40% of S&P 500
companies addressed sustainability in their annual reports or 10-Ks.108
Thirty-eight percent discussed sustainability issues in their annual proxy
statements, typically in a summary at the beginning of the filing.109
Companies may also choose to report matters beyond what the securities
laws require. The demand from both shareholders and other stakeholders for
information related to climate change and other sorts of sustainability
concerns, combined with the lack of detailed rules from the SEC, has led to
a growth of efforts to create voluntary disclosure standards. There are a
variety of organizations competing to provide frameworks for disclosure
concerning climate change. The Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) focuses
specifically on greenhouse gas emissions,110 and the TCFD also focuses on
climate change issues.111 In contrast, the Global Reporting Initiative
(GRI),112 Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB),113 and
International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC)114 cover a wide range of
sustainability topics. Some frameworks, like the TCFD, follow a
standards-based approach while others, like the CDP and SASB, include
more specific rules. In addition to organizations like these, which publish
publicly available frameworks that companies may use in their reporting,
other organizations gather information privately and use that information to
issue ratings concerning performance along a variety of metrics, including
metrics related to the environment and climate change. Leading examples
105
Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed. Reg. 6290
(Feb. 8, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 211, 231, 241).
106
Id.
107
COBURN & COOK, supra note 5, at 11–12.
108
KWON, STATE OF SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 5, at 33.
109
Id.
110
CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT, https://www.cdp.net/en (last visited Mar. 27, 2021).
111
TCFD, FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at i.
112
GLOB. REPORTING INITIATIVE, G4 SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING GUIDELINES (2013), https://c
ommdev.org/pdf/publications/Global-Reporting-Initiative-G4-Sustainability-Reporting-Guidelines.pdf.
113
SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD., SASB CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 1 (2017).
114
INT’L INTEGRATED REPORTING COUNCIL, THE INTERNATIONAL <IR> FRAMEWORK 2 (2013).
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include MSCI115 and Sustainalytics.116 In the United States, none of these
competing approaches have yet achieved clear market dominance.117
Voluntary reporting of regular sustainability reports is much more
widespread and extensive. A study of reporting in 2018 found that 92% of
S&P 500 countries offered sustainability information on their websites.118
About 78% of these companies issued sustainability reports.119 Ninety-five
percent offered environmental performance metrics, and 67% set quantified
environmental goals.120 Only a minority of the reports, 38%, obtained any
external assurance concerning their reports.121
The literature on disclosure under securities law in general, and
specifically on disclosure related to environmental issues, has identified
various benefits and costs of such disclosure. Disclosure helps both investors
and other stakeholders, such as customers and employees, decide whether or
not to associate with the disclosing company.122 Disclosure can reduce
informational asymmetries between the company and various stakeholders,
reducing moral hazard and adverse selection issues.123 The process of
gathering and evaluating information to be disclosed can also change and
improve internal decisionmaking.124 However, there are direct monetary
costs involved in gathering information. The process of gathering
information will also divert the time and attention of directors, officers, and
employees. Another concern is information overload.125
Given the availability of voluntary disclosure, are there market
imperfections that justify making some disclosure required?126 Mandatory
rules can standardize disclosure, making comparison across firms easier for
investors and others.127 Required sustainability disclosure could also
encourage the reduction of externalities in company behavior (e.g., emission

115

Our Purpose, MSCI, https://www.msci.com/our-purpose (last visited Mar. 27, 2021).
About Us, SUSTAINALYTICS, https://www.sustainalytics.com/about-us/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2021).
117
KWON, STATE OF SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 5, at 16–24; PUBLIC COMPANIES REPORT, supra
note 5, at 41.
118
KWON, STATE OF SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 5, at 27.
119
Id.
120
Id. at 29.
121
Id.
122
See supra note 101–02 and accompanying text.
123
Lipton, supra note 21, at 508–09; Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange
Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1209–11 (1999); Christensen
et al., supra note 29, at 15.
124
Lipton, supra note 21, at 509; Hillary A. Sale, Disclosure’s Purpose, 107 GEO. L.J. 1045, 1047 (2019).
125
Virginia Harper Ho, Disclosure Overload? Lessons for Risk Disclosure & ESG Reporting
Reform from the Regulation S-K Concept Release, 65 VILL. L. REV. 67, 70 (2020).
126
Christensen et al., supra note 29, at 18; Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach,
Information Disclosure and Corporate Governance, 67 J. FIN. 195, 195 (2012); Christian Leuz & Peter
Wysocki, Economic Consequences of Financial Reporting and Disclosure Regulation: A Review and
Suggestions for Future Research, 54 J. ACCT. RES. 525 (2016).
127
Christensen et al., supra note 29, at 18; PUBLIC COMPANIES REPORT, supra note 5, at 5.
116
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of GHGs).128 However, beyond the obvious direct costs of gathering and
disclosing information, if the disclosure rules are not well designed, they
may focus companies on low-value matters.129 Voluntary approaches may
also provide more flexibility for companies to disclose only information that
is relevant to their businesses, thereby reducing costs.130 The limited
evidence on mandatory sustainability disclosure suggests that reporting
regulation may increase costs, but it also may reduce harmful activities
targeted by the regulation.131
Some jurisdictions have recently adopted rules requiring disclosure of
various sustainability matters, including climate change.132 In 2016, France
implemented a significant law requiring disclosure specifically focused on
climate change.133 The law requires listed companies to disclose financial
risks related to climate change, the measures adopted to reduce them, and
the consequences of climate change for their activities.134 The European
Union is in the process of enacting rules concerning disclosure of
sustainability risks.135
As part of a broad release seeking public comment on a wide range of
disclosure issues, the SEC, in 2016, sought guidance on the need for more
detailed rules on ESG issues, including climate change.136 So far, the SEC
has not proposed any new rules.137 The Concept Release received a large
number of comments.138 Of those who commented, investors mostly
supported more extensive and rule-like disclosure rules, while companies
opposed such changes.139 In February of 2021, the acting chair of the SEC
issued a public statement directing the Division of Corporate Finance “to
enhance its focus on climate-related disclosure in public company
filings.”140 A month later she issued a request for public comments on such

128

Christensen et al., supra note 29, at 19.
Id. at 20.
130
PUBLIC COMPANIES REPORT, supra note 5, at 38.
131
Id. at 38–39.
132
FRENCH ENERGY TRANSITION LAW, supra note 83, at 4.
133
Id. at 6.
134
Id. at 7.
135
Paul Davies & Michael D. Green, EU Issues New Sustainable Investment Disclosure Rules,
LEXOLOGY (Apr. 5, 2019), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=61d5698f-bf73-451c-9c49bdc6b342442b.
136
Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S–K, 81 Fed. Reg. 23,916 (Apr. 22,
2016) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 229, 230, 232, 239, 240, 249).
137
See Jennifer Burns, Christine Robinson & Kristen Sullivan, The Atmosphere for Climate-Change
Disclosure, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Apr. 5, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2020/04/05/the-atmosphere-for-climate-change-disclosure/ (explaining the SEC’s 2010 guidance
remains relevant).
138
Ho, supra note 125, at 91.
139
Id. at 92.
140
Allison Herren Lee, Statement on the Review of Climate-Related Disclosure, SEC (Feb. 24,
2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/lee-statement-review-climate-related-disclosure.
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disclosure.141 The SEC’s Division of Enforcement has created a Climate and
ESG Task Force, which will focus on gaps in issuer disclosure.142
Climate-related disclosure is thus clearly high on the agenda of the SEC
under the Biden administration.
As we have seen, one way that disclosure may promote energy transition
is by causing shareholders and other stakeholders to reassess whom they
choose to patronize.143 Reflecting the shareholder primacy approach
discussed in Part I,144 the dominant though disputable145 view is that federal
securities law mandates disclosure solely for the benefit of investors and that
the disclosure should focus on the financial risks associated with an
investment. Disclosure around sustainability issues such as climate change
is then justified to the extent that such matters may have a material effect on
financial returns.146 That is clearly the position the SEC took in its 2010
guidance on climate change-related disclosure.147
Whether or not current securities law is understood as legally focused
only on investors, it is not just investors who use that disclosure—investors,
employees, and other stakeholders also use it. Information that may not be
material to financial results may be material to the interests of other stakeholders.
Regulation that focuses only on financial risks and returns will not force
companies to reveal all of the information that matters to other stakeholders.148
The literature reveals much concern about the quality of current
disclosure. The lack of mandatory rules allows companies to selectively pick
and choose what they want to disclose, emphasizing positive developments
and making it hard to compare developments across companies.149 The
IRRC Institute’s survey of S&P 500 company reporting found that most
companies pick and choose among various frameworks, customizing a
unique style.150 Only a minority obtain any external assurance.151
Investors are also unhappy with current disclosure. A recent survey of
institutional investors found that many believe that current “disclosures are
imprecise and not sufficiently informative.”152 They also believe that there
141
Allison Herren Lee, Public Input Welcomed on Climate Change Disclosure, SEC (Mar. 15,
2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/lee-climate-change-disclosures.
142
Press Release, SEC, SEC Announces Enforcement Task Force Focused on Climate and ESG
Issues (Mar. 4, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2021-42.
143
Supra note 101–02 and accompanying text.
144
Supra notes 30–35 and accompanying text.
145
Sale, supra note 124.
146
Fisch, supra note 21, 932–33.
147
See Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed. Reg. 6290,
6295–97 (Feb. 8, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 211, 231, 241).
148
Lipton, Not Everything Is About Investors, supra note 21; Ann M. Lipton, What We Talk About
When We Talk About Shareholder Primacy, 69 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 863, 866–67 (2019).
149
Fisch, supra note 21, at 947.
150
KWON, STATE OF SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 5, at 31.
151
Id. at 29.
152
Emirhan Ilhan, Philipp Krueger, Zacharias Sautner & Laura T. Starks, Climate Risk Disclosure
and Institutional Investors 17 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 661/2020, 2020).
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should be more standardization.153 Another recent survey similarly reported
inconsistencies in quantitative disclosures between companies, which limits
comparability (for example, differing approaches to reporting CO2
emissions), as well as gaps in narrative disclosures, which undermines
investors’ ability to understand companies’ strategies for managing risks and
opportunities.154 An analysis of public comment letters to the SEC’s 2016
questions on the current state of disclosure showed that most responding
investors said that current disclosure leads to too little disclosure and too
much boilerplate.155 The lack of standardization is thus a serious concern.
This is a widely-recognized justification for mandatory disclosure regulation
in the general literature on securities law.156 But private coordination may
be able to set effective standards without the need for governmental
regulation, and private standard-setting may be more likely to agree upon
efficient standards than government agencies.157 Perhaps, for instance, the
recent announcement by BlackRock’s CEO158 that they are pushing their
portfolio companies to use SASB and TCFD will help focus disclosure on
those two standards. More recently, many of the leading organizations
promoting voluntary climate-related and ESG disclosure have made efforts
to increase coordination among private standards. In September of 2020,
five organizations—CDP, SASB, GRI, the Climate Disclosure Standards
Board, and Integrated Reporting—released a paper detailing how they intend
to work together to help create a more standardized reporting system.159
B. U.S. Interview Findings
Our U.S. interview participants were employed by a variety of types of
entities, including operating companies, investors, asset managers, law
firms, and advocacy organizations.160 We asked them several open-ended
questions concerning disclosure related to climate change. These included
whether there is agreement on the importance of climate change disclosure
and what it should look like; how disclosure affects investment and
engagement decisions by investors and asset managers; how disclosure
practices could be improved; and whether and how disclosure affects risk
management and operating decisions by the disclosing companies. We describe
here some of the patterns that emerged in the participants’ answers that help
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elaborate what is happening in practice with disclosure, and the extent to
which it is (or is not) shaping corporate behavior regarding climate change.
Participants confirmed that there has been a major increase in climate
change disclosure in recent years. However, their overall view was that the
quality of this disclosure is mixed. While larger companies and those in
industries more exposed to climate change risks are more likely to make
detailed and helpful disclosures, many companies cherry-pick positive
information or make vague or boilerplate statements.
One participant, who advises companies on disclosure and engagement,
commented, “It’s gone from nothing to a policy-and-platitudes type of
disclosure.”161 Another, who works as a securities lawyer at a law firm,
responded that “most companies do nothing,”162 but noted that, for those
who do report, disclosure can vary from “lofty goals and statements as
opposed to some others that really give graphs, give data, give hard
information.”163 An employee of an investment firm with a focus on
responsible investment noted that disclosure is “a relatively new area” for
small and mid-cap companies, with “a huge amount of work to be done” to
effect improvements.164 This participant thought that overall “we’re on the
right path,”165 whereas others voiced a need for more standardization to
improve quality: “[T]he next step is to put more data around it, and more
meat on the bones so that the people who consume this information can see
exactly what you’re talking about, what the risks are.”166
A factor underlying the current variability in disclosure practice appears
to be proliferating available models, with participants noting the presence of
competing standards. One participant, who is an employee at an asset
management company, commented on the lack of consensus, noting, “It’s
actually worse than that. Everybody wants to set the standard. The
proliferation of sustainability codes is getting to be absurd.”167 This position
was reflected in the interview results as a whole, with some participants
seeing no particular standard currently emerging as the leading one. Others
did point to one or two standards as the current or emerging leader, but
identified different standards in this regard, with CDP, TCFD, GRI, and
SASB all being mentioned. As one consultant participant described it:
There’s a bunch of people currently looking at MSCI, others
looking at TCFD, others thinking about SRI, SASB. So, there’s
all these different organizations out there. Different organizations
that are in a lot of ways competing with each other for the
161
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attention of the various stakeholders, and it contributes to a lot
of confusion, but at the same time is also demonstrating just
how much energy and need there is in this space.168
A frequent point made by participants was that the lack of common
standards makes it harder to compare practice across companies, or even for
the same company over time. A securities lawyer commented:
Right now there’s no standards, so the ability to do comparability
just doesn’t exist, and when you look at data you just don’t
know if this is apples to apples to anything. Because there’s no
standards in the way we measured it this year, the same way
we measured it last year, the way we’ll measure it next year.169
On the company side, as well as for investors, the proliferation of
standards is a problem, as companies face pressures to respond to varying
requests for information, and must decide which, if any, standards to follow.
Although companies generally opposed new SEC disclosure rules for
sustainability matters in comments to the 2016 release,170 the growth of
standards since then may give more reason for companies to accept, or at
least less strongly oppose, new rulemaking that would provide uniformity.171
As one of our company-side interviewees remarked, “I think clarity is a
helpful thing, and so I think if the SEC were to come out with a required
standard of disclosure it would be helpful, because it would simplify our
work, and it would simplify the work for the investor.”172
Despite the variability and lack of comparability at present, practices in
climate change disclosure are clearly evolving. In the last few years, it has
gone from imprecise qualitative statements, to more precise and detailed
quantitative metrics, to setting specific targets to be attained. A participant
on the investor side commented particularly on the emergence of disclosure
using targets. According to this participant, “the best companies know why
or why they cannot hit a target,” with sometimes the most useful disclosures
being about “why you can’t hit a target.”173
As noted above, many argue that customers, employees, and other
stakeholders are major intended audiences of sustainability disclosure, not
just investors.174 Several of our interviewees made the same point, noting
diverse disclosure drivers such as “brand enhancement,”175 particularly with
millennial customers who may have a deep concern about climate issues.176
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Indeed, where disclosure has a real effect on company behavior, it may be
more because of concern about the company’s reputation with other
stakeholders than with shareholders. One participant, a securities lawyer,
related an anecdote about a board receiving a shareholder proposal, which
the board was initially reluctant to engage with, “but when they changed the
narrative a little bit and thought about the value of the responsibility report
and some more reporting on environmental as a way to attract millennials
who are a target of their employment efforts, then they became more
receptive to it.”177
In the past, climate-related disclosures have often been made in separate
voluntary sustainability reports rather than in mandated securities disclosures.
Several interviewees noted, however, a significant benefit of including such
disclosure within financial disclosure documents mandated under securities
law: information gathered for securities law disclosure gets more attention
within a corporation due to liability concerns.178 As one pension fund
employee participant remarked, “I think the implications will force
management and the board to engage in a more meaningful way.”179 Indeed,
the threat of liability has induced public companies to build in extensive
systems for collecting and verifying such information. There is both an
internal audit system and external auditors. Top executive officers review
the process and resulting information, and the board is involved below.180
By contrast, a weakness of the voluntary disclosure of sustainability
information is that the collection and processing of such information may be
done within a sustainability office that is isolated from other operating
divisions. As a consequence, these reports, “even though they get some level
of review, they clearly don’t get the level of review and scrutiny as if you’re
actually going to take the extra step of putting it in your proxy.”181 According
to a sustainability officer participant, “the best thing that could happen with
disclosure is integrated reporting, meaning not having a separate
sustainability report with the GRI index and an annual report.”182 This would
help make such reporting standardized, central to corporate operations, and
a requirement rather than a voluntary option.183 However, this was not a
universal view. A lawyer within an operating company noted one of the
counter-arguments in favor of separate sustainability reports as being the
likelihood of more information being disclosed. This participant commented:
While I understand the movement to include things in all
filings so it’s together, I think the focus of CR reports, if done
177
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well, probably give you more and better information than if
you were to try and fold it into a filed document where it’s one
of a number of issues. This topic in particular is an area where
people want more details. Probably more details than would
be considered material.184
The ultimate question about the new climate change disclosure practice
is whether it is causing companies to respond to climate change risks and
opportunities more quickly. In a context where climate change disclosure
only started in earnest recently and is very rapidly evolving, the interview
evidence shows that many factors are working to both encourage and block
company change. Reflecting this, interviewees expressed different opinions
about the effect of disclosure on company behavior.
No interviewee on the company side pointed to any clear way in which
disclosure was causing their company to behave differently in a substantive
way. The exception was the corporate sustainability officer, noted above,
who spoke of several instances where concern about customer reaction
caused the company to pay attention to a few matters.185 Most interviewees
on the company side seemed to think their companies were already heavily
engaged with climate change questions and the pressure for disclosure was
simply pushing them to better communicate what they were already doing.
Another sustainability officer more forcefully denied that shareholder
proposals encouraging more disclosure would change corporate behavior,
characterizing this as “a mistaken theory of change.”186
Some on the investor side had more hope that disclosure would
eventually change behavior, particularly as disclosure evolves to include
more detailed metrics and targets. A pension fund employee opined: “If
SASB were ever to realize its true objective of getting into the financial
statement, it may not provide as good information to investors, but it will be
more likely to change company behavior because it’s the kind of disclosure
that ultimately has to go to the boardroom.”187 The same person continued:
“There is no question that there is an uptake in engagement and more
companies understand the need to engage and even now at the board level. I
think there is an emphasis in trying to appear responsive to investors.” A
former pension fund employee expressed more impatience with relying on
existing disclosure rules, stating, “the regulatory system has a much larger
role to play, and our legal system, and frankly our governmental
agencies.”188 Overall, then, it appears based on the interviewees’ insights
that increasing disclosure has not yet changed company behavior
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significantly in the United States, but has potential to do so if pursued in a
more standardized and rigorous way.
C. Australian Interview Findings
In Australia, our interview participants came from a range of different
entities, including ASX50 listed companies, investor groups, asset
managers, regulators, superannuation funds, and civil society advocacy
organizations.189 As with our U.S. participants, we asked them a similar set
of open-ended questions concerning Australian business practices on
disclosure related to climate change. We first describe here the relevant
corporate legal requirements pertaining to disclosure by Australian
companies, before comparing the patterns that emerged in the participants’
answers to those of our U.S. participants.
As in the United States, federal corporations law in Australia does not
mandate specific climate-related disclosures, nor any form of sustainability
reporting. Instead, companies listed on the ASX must provide financial
statements which present a “true and fair view” of the company’s financial
position and performance, as well as disclose risks that are financially
material for their businesses in a Director’s Report.190 Although Australian
company and securities regulators have not introduced an equivalent to the
SEC’s 2010 guidance,191 various recent regulatory guides and statements
indicate a growing expectation of disclosure of climate (and other ESG) risks
where those risks are judged to be financially material for ASX-listed
companies.192 Influential opinions issued by leading corporate lawyers have
189
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also highlighted the liability exposure of companies that fail to disclose
financially material climate business risks.193 This legal theory was tested in
the case of Abrahams v. Commonwealth Bank of Australia, involving a
shareholder claim against one of the country’s largest banks, alleging a failure
to disclose climate risks in its 2016 Annual Report.194 The proceedings were
withdrawn, but only following the bank’s commitment to improve disclosure
practices, with noticeable improvements in subsequent annual reports.195
A key difference between Australian and U.S. climate risk disclosure
practice is developing consensus in Australia around the framework that
should guide any such climate-related financial disclosures, with the TCFD
emerging as the supported standard in this regard and many leading
companies formally adopting this approach.196 The TCFD has been
favorably referenced as a climate risk disclosure framework by the
Australian corporate regulator, ASIC.197 It also appears that institutional
investors in Australia have played a key role in raising the profile of the
TCFD by using this framework in their engagement strategies with
companies. For example, the Australian Council of Superannuation
Investors (ACSI), whose members manage AUD $2.2 trillion in assets, has
described the TCFD recommendations as the emerging “gold standard” for
climate risk reporting by Australian listed companies.198 The TCFD’s 2019
status report indicates that, globally, 785 companies and other organizations
have committed to support the TCFD.199 This growing global acceptance,
alongside default adoption of the TCFD framework in countries such as
Australia, may be influential for U.S. practice as different disclosure
standards compete there for prominence.
193
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Our results from interviews with Australian participants showed a
similar pattern to the United States of highly variable disclosure practice that
is in a considerable state of flux. Overall, the investors interviewed described
the disclosure practices of Australian companies as “totally inadequate,”
“under-developed,” “reactive and piecemeal,” “non-strategic,” “pretty
poor,” and “deeply deficient.” They expressed concerns that companies were
focusing narrowly and not adequately addressing all forms of climate risk
and that they were not integrating and quantifying risks into financial
statements as recommended by the TCFD.200 However, they also noted that
climate risk disclosure was in its infancy and evolving quickly; concerns
about the quality and usefulness of climate disclosures have led to a debate
like that in the United States over whether there is a need for more
standardization and higher levels of regulation in this sphere.201
While there is a strong momentum towards Australian companies and
regulators embracing the TCFD framework as a basis for disclosures, it is
not clear that these new disclosure expectations are driving companies to
respond to climate change risks and opportunities more quickly or to transition
to cleaner energy practices. Early experimentation with scenario analysis by
companies (a key recommendation of the TCFD) shows a tendency for even
highly exposed companies to portray their business-as-usual prospects
favorably, despite the associated risks, often suggesting that near-to-medium
term prospects are strong for highly climate-damaging products and
operations (e.g., fossil fuel exploration and development).
In interviews, investors expressed some disappointment that such
climate risk-exposed companies using Paris Agreement-compliant scenario
analysis—an approach recommended by the TCFD202—were still reporting
no negative impact of climate change on their businesses.203 Subsequent
surveys of company reporting confirm these problems and suggest that there
has been little improvement. For example, a Market Forces 2019 analysis of
the public disclosures of seventy-two ASX100 companies operating in
sectors facing the highest levels of climate risk found that climate risk
disclosure across these companies remains “largely superficial.”204 For the
200
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United States, this experience suggests that even if consensus can be reached
around a particular voluntary disclosure standard over time, this still may not
be enough to drive shifts in corporate behavior that support energy transition
without greater standardization and specification regarding required disclosures.
III. SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS AND ENGAGEMENT
Growing shareholder activism and engagement on climate
change-related matters specifically, and on ESG issues more generally, has
a public and a private face. The public face is shareholder proposals, in
which shareholders use Rule 14a-8 to include mostly advisory proposals in
a company’s proxy and have their fellow shareholders vote on the proposal
at the annual meeting.205 Shareholders need to follow only minimal
procedural rules to have their proposals included, although companies may
argue that the proposal should be excluded for one of thirteen specified
reasons.206 The number of such proposals submitted in a year has increased
substantially. The votes in favor of such proposals have also increased
dramatically, from the single digits to an average in the range of 25%, with
many proposals in the 30% or 40% range and some occasionally passing,
most notably climate change proposals at ExxonMobil, Occidental
Petroleum, and PPL.207 The private face of shareholder engagement is
dialogue between individual or groups of shareholders and companies in
meetings, phone calls, or emails. Private engagement with a focus on
environmental or social issues has increased significantly in the past decade.208
As seen in our earlier analysis, shareholder engagement aims to
encourage a faster transition through inducing companies to shift internal
resources to cleaner energy uses.209 This Part explores developments in
shareholder engagement and the impact that they are having on climate
change action.
A. Legal and Institutional Developments
The growth in shareholder engagement has taken place during a
transformation of the ownership of shares in U.S. public corporations. To
understand that engagement, one needs to understand that context,
205
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particularly the nature of several major types of institutional investors. In
1945, over 90% of the shares of publicly-traded U.S. corporations were
owned by individuals; now, about 80% of shares are owned by institutions
rather than individuals.210 This has the potential to transform corporate
governance, overcoming the separation of ownership from control
traditionally seen as the core governance issue.211 But whether or not it will
depends on the behavior of institutional investors. After describing important
types of shareowners, we discuss several important legal developments and
then some empirical evidence on shareholder engagement.
Socially responsible investment funds are the most obvious candidate
for investors that could engage with companies to focus on climate change
and other sustainability matters. Such funds screen the companies in which
they invest based on specific sustainability metrics. A quarter of all dollars
under professional management are invested in such funds.212 But not all
such funds support ESG proposals. For instance, sustainability funds
sponsored by BlackRock, JP Morgan, and Vanguard have been criticized for
not supporting ESG proposals.213
Another type of investor that submits ESG proposals are some public
employee and union pension funds.214 Controversy surrounds pension fund
activism. Critics see pension funds as serving special interests that conflict with
the interests of other shareholders.215 Others counter that successful pension
fund activism focuses on items that advance the financial interests of
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shareholders, which can receive the support of other shareholders, and that
pension funds decrease the collective action problem shareholders face.216
A third important type of investor is big asset managers, including many
index funds. Of these, the “Big Three” have become hugely important shareholders,
with BlackRock and Vanguard each owning over 5% of the shares of most U.S.
public corporations, and, often, Fidelity is also over that threshold.217 These three
companies thus have pivotal voting power for close proposals. Some critics218
have argued that the big passive investors face incentives that discourage them from
activism,219 and significant evidence supports this view.220 Others dispute this
criticism. Several argue that index fund managers do have incentives to engage in
active stewardship.221 Significant evidence supports this counterview as well.222
216
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Paper 467/2019, 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3295098 (explaining that
shareholders of index funds can leave at any time and therefore there are incentives for passive investors);
Michael Barzuza, Quinn Curtis & David H. Webber, Shareholder Value(s): Index Fund ESG Activism
and the New Millennial Corporate Governance, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 1243, 1251 (2020) (detailing how
index funds have demonstrated effective stewardship by activism in regard to ESG issues).
222
The Big Three are increasing their stewardship teams, engaging in hundreds of private dialogues
every year, and interacting with more activist investors by letting them initiate proposals then deciding
how to vote. Fisch, supra note 221, at 49–51. An empirical study suggests index funds allocate resources
to votes for which they are pivotal and that their ownership promotes value-creating proposals. FatimaZahra Filali Adib, Passive Aggressive: How Index Funds Vote on Corporate Governance Proposals,
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3480484. Another empirical study finds that the Big Three focus their
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Thus, some funds and individuals focused on socially responsible investing
and some pension funds propose most climate change proposals, while the
votes of the Big Three and a few others determine their success. How one
evaluates both current and future shareholder engagement depends on how
one evaluates the incentives and informational capacity of those investors.223
Several legal developments have affected the ability of investors to
pursue ESG proposals. Many investors and asset managers are subject to
strict fiduciary duty under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA), which provides that fiduciaries must act “for the exclusive
purpose of [] providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries . . . .”224
The Department of Labor interprets this language as requiring that
fiduciaries may only consider financial returns and risks in making
investment decisions.225 In a series of interpretive bulletins, the Department
has seesawed in how much leeway fiduciaries have to frame sustainability
factors as financial risks.226 More recently, the Department of Labor at the
end of the Trump administration adopted rules that further limit the ability
to consider ESG factors in selecting investments, although the Biden
administration has announced that it is staying enforcement of this rule.227
The Department’s guidance has also addressed ESG activism in
shareholder engagement by ERISA plans. Here too the guidance has
seesawed. Under the Obama Administration, the Department was relatively
encouraging of engagement. Under the Trump Administration, the
engagement on firms with high carbon emissions. Jose Azar, Miguel Duro, Igor Kadach & Gaizka
Ormazabal, The Big Three and Corporate Climate Emission Around the World, https://papers.ssrn.com
/abstract=3553258. A different—and in some ways opposite—criticism is that the big investors are
becoming too big and influential. John Coates argues that if current trends continue, a group of twelve
or so individuals will have practical power over most U.S. public companies, creating serious legitimacy
concerns. John C. Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I: The Problem of Twelve (Harv.
Pub. L. Working Paper, Paper No. 19-07, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3247337. A counterargument
suggests that the Big Three may reduce significant social externalities, since they care about how policies
adopted by any given company will affect the value of their whole portfolio, not just the adopting
company. Condon, supra note 41, at 1.
223
A final type of institutional investor worth noting is activist hedge funds. These identify
under-performing companies, buy a significant stake in them, and then propose value-enhancing
strategies, threatening a proxy fight to replace incumbent directors should the board refuse. There is much
controversy surrounding the social impact of activist funds. For a leading statement of the arguments in
favor, see generally Bebchuk et al., supra note 36; for a leading statement of the arguments against, see
generally Coffee & Palia, supra note 36. There is concern that activist funds increase shareholder value
by diverting resources from other stakeholders. Thus, those who advocate policies promoting shareholder
voice as a way to address climate change should worry that those same policies may enable activist hedge
funds who could have an opposite effect.
224
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i) (2012).
225
Osofsky et al., Energy Re-Investment, supra note 4, at 618–19. It can be argued that this is an overly
narrow interpretation of the exclusive purpose language, and that the interests of employees investing for their
retirement should include their interests as employees as well. See Webber, supra note 214, at 181–211.
226
Osofsky et al., Energy Re-Investment, supra note 4, at 618–19.
227
“Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments,” 85 Fed. Reg. 72846 (November 13, 2020);
U.S. Department of Labor Statement Regarding Enforcement of Its Final Rules on ESG Investments and
Proxy Voting by Employee Benefit Plans (March 10, 2021).
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Department issued new guidance stating that typically fiduciaries should not
engage in activities that “involve a significant expenditure of funds . . . .”228
If a fiduciary is considering engagement on environmental or social factors,
that may well require “a documented analysis of the cost of the shareholder
activity compared to the expected economic benefit . . . .”229 At the end of
the administration, the Trump Department of Labor adopted a new rule
further limiting ESG engagement by ERISA fiduciaries, although the Biden
administration has stayed enforcement of this rule.230 The President also
issued an Executive Order on promoting coal, oil, and natural gas which
includes a provision directing the Department of Labor to review “existing
Department of Labor guidance on the fiduciary responsibilities for proxy
voting to determine whether any such guidance should be rescinded,
replaced, or modified to ensure consistency with current law and policies
that promote long-term growth and maximize return on ERISA plan
assets.”231 Thus the Trump Administration acted to discourage ESG activism
generally, and such activism focused on climate change specifically, but the
Biden Administration is moving to reverse those measures.
The other significant legal development concerns limits on the ability of
shareholders to use Rule 14a-8.232 The SEC recently limited which
shareholders can use Rule 14a-8. Previously, shareholders who had held at
least $2,000 in shares or 1% of the securities were entitled to vote for at least
one year are eligible to use Rule 14a-8.233 Under the new rule, shareholders
can only use the Rule if they have held $2,000 in securities entitled to vote
for at least three years, $15,000 for at least two years, or $25,000 for at least
one year. These threshold levels mostly affect individual shareholders rather
than institutional investors.234
228
Memorandum from John J. Canary, Dir. of Reguls. & Interpretations, Dep’t of Lab., to Mabel
Capolongo, Dir. of Enf’t, Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin. 4 (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.dol.gov/agencies/
ebsa/employers-and-advisers/guidance/field-assistance-bulletins/2018-01 [hereinafter Field Assistance
Bulletin No. 2018–01].
229
Id. at 5. See Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social
Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee, 72 STAN. L. REV. 381 (2020)
(explaining that while ESG factors used by a trustee can violate the duty of loyalty, ESG investing may
still be used if it will benefit the beneficiary directly and the trustee’s motivation is solely to obtain that
direct benefit).
230
Fiduciary Duties Regarding Proxy Voting and Shareholder Rights, 85 C.F.R. 2509, 2550 (2020);
EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR STATEMENT
REGARDING ENFORCEMENT OF ITS FINAL RULES ON ESG INVESTMENTS AND PROXY VOTING BY
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS (2021).
231
Exec. Order No. 13868, Promoting Energy Infrastructure and Economic Growth, 84 Fed. Reg.
15,495, 15,497 (Apr. 10, 2019).
232
Supra notes 205–07 and accompanying text.
233
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b) (2020).
234
Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, Procedural Requirements and Resubmission Thresholds Under
Exchange Act Rule 14a-8 Release No. 34-89964 (Sept. 23, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/
2019/34-87458.pdf. A resolution has been introduced in the Senate to use the Congressional Review Act
to reverse this rule. A majority vote in the House and Senate is required to reverse the rule. Hazel
Bradford, Senate Moves to Undo SEC Shareholder Rights Rule Change, Pensions & Investments, https:/
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Also notable is a shift in the SEC’s interpretation of the ordinary
business operations exclusion. Proposals that have met the procedural
requirements of Rule 14a-8 may still be excluded if they fall within one of a
number of exclusions given in the Rule.235 One of these bases for exclusion
is “[i]f the proposal deals with a matter relating to the company’s ordinary
business operations.”236 The SEC bases decisions on whether or not a
proposal is excludable under the ordinary business basis on two
considerations. The first is whether the matters “are so fundamental to
management’s ability to run a company on a day-to-day basis that they could
not, as a practical matter, be subject to direct shareholder oversight.”237
However, a proposal is not excludable under that consideration if it would
“raise policy issues so significant that it would be appropriate for a
shareholder vote.”238 The significance of climate change protects most
proposals on this point. The second consideration is whether a proposal
“micro-manage[s]” the company.239 In several recent no-action letters, the
SEC’s staff has allowed the exclusion of proposals on this ground where the
proposals encourage companies to impose GHG reduction targets.240 In a
new Staff Legal Bulletin, the SEC explains that the key differentiator
between excludable and non-excludable proposals is “the level of
prescriptiveness” of the proposal.241 Policy significance has not saved overly
prescriptive proposals. In 2019, the SEC staff agreed with the issuers’
requests to be allowed to exclude climate change proposals 45% of the
time.242 Here again there is some initial evidence that the SEC under the
Biden Administration may change course from its predecessor. The acting
chair in a speech noted she has asked the staff to revise guidance on the
shareholder proposal process, and that this could involve reaffirming that
proposals cannot be excluded if they concern socially significant issues, such

/www.pionline.com/regulation/senate-moves-undo-sec-shareholder-rights-rule-change (March 26, 2021).
The Financial CHOICE Act, passed in the House, would have imposed stricter restrictions. Joseph A.
Hall, The Financial CHOICE Act and the Debate Over Shareholder Proposals, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE (June 28, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/06/28/the-financial-choice
-act-and-the-debate-over-shareholder-proposals.
235
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i).
236
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(7).
237
Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, Final Rule: Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Release
No. 34-40018 (1998).
238
Id.
239
Id.
240
See, e.g., Devon Energy Corp., SEC Staff No-Action Letter, 2019 WL 1058333 (Mar. 4, 2019)
(“On March 4, 2019, we issued a no-action response expressing our informal view that the Company
could exclude the Proposal from its proxy materials for its upcoming annual meeting on the basis that
the Proposal would micromanage the Company by seeking to impose specific methods for implementing
complex policies.”.
241
SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14k (CF) (Oct. 16, 2019).
242
MAJORITY ACTION, supra note 208, at 8.
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as climate change, just because they may include components that could
otherwise be viewed as “ordinary business.”243
Reflecting the growth of institutional investors, in the 2019 proxy
season, environmental and social proposals submitted were down somewhat
from the previous year but were still almost half of all proposals submitted
(323 out of 678).244 Only a little under half (146) of those proposals went to
a vote;245 proposals are withdrawn when proponents reach a compromise
with the issuer. Average support for such proposals was 28%, as compared
to 10% ten years earlier.246 Again, in 2020, the total number of
environmental and social proposals submitted continued to decline (303) but
the percentage voted on and number passed increased.247 Almost half went
to vote in 2019 and 2020 (up from one-third in 2018) and a record fifteen
proposals passed, despite a lower number of submissions overall.248 Average
support was 27%.249 Informal engagement through dialogues with company
employees, officers, and sometimes directors has also increased.250 A survey
of 439 institutional investors found only 16% had not engaged in any way
with companies on climate change.251
There is limited evidence suggesting that ESG proposals can have some
effect on corporate behavior. One study looks at 847 engagements on a range
of ESG matters with 660 separate companies by a European investment
management firm between 2005 and 2014.252 About half of the engagements
were aimed at improving disclosure, and half were aimed at company
operations.253 The activist considered the engagement file successfully
closed 60% of the time, with success defined as the target company
complying with the shareholder’s request.254

243
Allison Herren Lee, Speech by Allison Herren Lee on Meeting Investor Demand for Climate and
ESG Information at the SEC, https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/03/16/speech-by-acting-chair-leeon-meeting-investor-demand-for-climate-and-esg-information-at-the-sec/#20 (March 16, 2021).
244
Marc Treviño, 2019 Proxy Season Review: Part 1—Rule 14a-8 Shareholder Proposals, HARV.
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (July 26, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/07/26/2019proxy-season-review-part-1-rule-14a-8-shareholder-proposals. The comparisons are for the figures as of
the middle of the two years, but most proposals are voted on by then.
245
Id.
246
Id.
247
SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, 2020 PROXY SEASON REVIEW: PART 1: RULE 14A-8 SHAREHOLDER
PROPOSALS 2 (2020), https://www.sullcrom.com/files/upload/SC-Publication-2020-Proxy-Season-Revie
w-Part-1-Rule-14a-8.pdf.
248
Id. at 3.
249
Id.
250
CERES, supra note 208, at 23–25.
251
Philipp Krueger, Zacharias Sautner & Laura T. Starks, The Importance of Climate Risks for
Institutional Investors 3–5 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 610/2019, 2019),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3235190.
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Barko et al., supra note 28, at 2.
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Id. at 10, 13.
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Id. at 3, 20.
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A study on index fund voting on shareholder proposals found that close
shareholder proposal votes that pass have a 2.04% higher one-day abnormal
return than those that fail, but this is driven primarily by governance
proposals.255 A survey of institutional investors on climate change
engagement found that in 71% of the cases the targeted firms responded to
their investors, but mostly that consisted of simply acknowledging the
issue—successful completion of a typical engagement is reported by only
25% of those surveyed.256
Thus, the evidence suggests that at least some shareholder engagement
does succeed in both creating the desired change by the target and also may
improve firm performance by some measures. But that appears to be driven
largely by governance proposals, the “G” in “ESG.” Systematic evidence on
the effect of climate change proposals is hard to find, which is not surprising
given how recent their rise has been and how rapidly they are evolving. The
interviews described in the following two sections thus provide an important
way to understand better the impact of this emerging engagement on
climate change.
B. U.S. Interview Findings
In our interviews with the fourteen U.S. participants, questions
concerning shareholder engagement included how they approach
company-investor engagement; how investors use proposals to pressure
companies on issues like climate change; how companies respond to
proposals; whether proposals affect company practices related to climate
change; and whether their employer supports proposals to limit use of Rule
14a-8. In the following sections, we describe some of the patterns we saw
in their answers that provide a practice-based lens on some of the debates
in the literature discussed above.
All of our participants saw ESG matters as receiving a greatly increased
degree of attention from both investors and company management compared
to the norm not that many years ago. This was regarded as true both for
shareholder proposals and for more informal engagement between investors
and companies. For instance, a director at an energy company commented,
“I’ve been briefed that some large shareholders say, ‘don’t call us we’ll call
you’ because everyone is doing more engagement.”257
Climate change was identified as one of the leading topics for
shareholder engagement within the general rubric of environmental and
social matters. Votes on these proposals are also increasing. As one
investment manager at a non-profit foundation noted: “15% used to be a
good showing on a social environmental proposal, and we are now getting
255

Adib, supra note 222, at 2.
Krueger, supra note 251, at 27.
257
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256
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majority votes on climate resolutions, at both big companies, like Occidental
or Exxon, and even smaller companies; [that’s] enough . . . to make
corporate secretaries and boards pay attention.”258
Participants noted that there is a two-way interaction between formal
and public shareholder proposals, and informal and private dialogue. On the
one hand, proposals often emerge after a process of informal discussion has
gone on for a while. A sustainability officer at a food company described the
process as follows:
Typically for us, we’ve been engaged with a shareholder for
some period of time before they even file a resolution. So, we
will have had at least three or four conversations with them,
explaining our position, talking about what we’re doing, and
in some cases, talking about disclosure. There have obviously
been cases where we’ve increased our disclosure of what
we’re doing, which resulted in not getting a resolution filed.259
On the other hand, sometimes a shareholder may use a proposal to
initiate a conversation. A pension fund activist characterized the use of
shareholder proposals as “really an invitation to engage” and “a way of
trying to get the board’s attention.”260
Our interview findings indicate that companies’ responses to receipt of
climate-related shareholder proposals vary considerably. Some companies
will engage little or not at all and either try to exclude the proposal or,
alternatively, allow it to be included on the assumption that it will not receive
majority approval. Other companies will engage with the proponents and try
to assuage their concerns, either by convincing them that they are already
behaving as the proponents wish or sometimes by changing their behavior
to comply.261 There is likely to be a trend for more companies to move to the
latter, more responsive camp, as proposals become more common and attract
more yes votes, and as large, actively engaged shareholders become more
insistent. As one securities lawyer noted, clients opting to do nothing in
response to a proposal were increasingly “a minority of companies in this
day and age; most choose to engage.”262
As for informal engagement dialogues, these can be in person or on the
phone. On the investor side, our interviews indicated that a growing number
of investors are bringing up climate change in their discussions with
companies. A sustainability officer commented that this is particularly a
focus of smaller ESG boutique investment firms, but “increasingly, large
investment firms or shareholders are asking us to talk about these issues,
258

Interview with US3 (Aug. 30, 2018).
Interview with US5 (Sept. 27, 2018).
260
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261
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262
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[with it] typically [being] the ESG specialist from those firms that we’re
engaged with.”263
On the company side, in an engagement where sustainability issues are
likely to arise, company participants will often include someone from the
corporate secretary’s office or investor relations and a chief sustainability
officer or another employee in the sustainability group. Directors are less
likely to be involved, although they may join discussions with large
shareholders. An investor-side participant from a company based in the
United Kingdom, but with a U.S. presence, observed:
In the U.S., our positions are much smaller. It varies, but I
would say that the most typical combination of people who are
on the phone is the head of investor relations or some sort of
corporate secretary and often they will bring their internal head
of sustainability, head of CSR, head of environmental strategy.
There’s some content person who tends to be responsible for
disclosure, and then maybe there’s going to be some lawyer
on the phone who’s worried about disclosure issues.264
Several interview participants on the investor side noted a growing
practice of engaging with groups of investors rather than one investor on its
own. The groups could be informal networks, or through formal
organizations and alliances. A former activist at a pension fund confirmed
this trend of “collaboration with other shareholders,” often as a way to
overcome the capacity constraints of working alone.265
Interviewees noted that the topics of both shareholder proposals and
informal engagement may not seem immediately relevant for climate change
but are nonetheless importantly related. For instance, a number of proposals
now ask companies to disclose their expenditures on lobbying. One pension
fund activist involved with Climate Action 100 talked about filing a
lobbying disclosure proposal directed at uncovering situations where
companies “state one position publicly while spending their money privately
in ways that are inconsistent with their public[ly] stated views.”266
Another common type of proposal, not explicitly about climate change
but relevant for achieving climate change-related aims, calls for proxy
access, asking companies to adopt rules allowing shareholders to use the
company proxy to nominate candidates for the board. This can then be used
to pressure companies to put persons on the board with significant
experience related to the environment, and climate change in particular—an
emerging focus that several interview participants noted. As one interviewee
said, “It’s our strategy to try and elevate climate risk into the boardroom,
263

Interview with US5 (Sept. 27, 2018).
Interview with US6 (Oct. 5, 2018).
265
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and if our boards aren’t climate competent then [proxy access] gives
investors a tool to put new directors on the board who may be a little more
sensitive to those risks or knowledgeable.”267
As with disclosure, the ultimate question about shareholder engagement
is whether and how it is affecting underlying company operations and risk
management. Engagement around climate change on a widespread basis is
still quite new and rapidly evolving. Changes to behavior may take time and
further evolution of engagement. Moreover, it is hard to disentangle the effects
of engagement from a variety of other factors that are pushing companies to
address climate change. Perhaps for these reasons, it is hard to discern from
our interviewees clear and hard signs that engagement has yet significantly
changed company behavior, but there are some signs of early achievements.
The reactions differed notably for interview participants on the company
side versus those on the investor side. On the company side, the general
reaction was that engagement may cause their company to more clearly and
fully disclose what they are doing, but that they were already actively
addressing climate issues before investor engagement, for other reasons.268
Noting the uncertainty on this issue, one said:
It’s always a little hard to say where it’s coming from, right? I
mean the fact that at one meeting hearing you’re getting a
shareholder proposal on this issue. Does that have some
incremental increase in your interest in asking questions about
it at future meetings? Probably. But I think a lot of that, what
the board discusses and what the board reviews is still very
much driven by management putting the agenda together of
what they view as most impacting the business.269
Interview participants on the investor side were sometimes more
cautiously optimistic about the effects of engagement on behavior. They
rarely identified specific effects, but they made two broader points. First,
along the lines of the old adage, “you can’t manage what you don’t
measure,”270 there is evidence of “incremental movement by these firms to
(1) disclose more about what they know and (2) really start to think about
internally what they do.”271 This was described as “a first step” and “a
tracking mechanism,” with the effect that as “more and more assets . . . are
tied to these environmental performance indicators and as asset dollars
move, that gets everyone’s attention.”272
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Second, investor participants expressed a view that engagement is
changing communication and culture among directors and officers. For
instance, one remarked, “I think we are changing conversations in the
boardroom, which is healthy.”273 Another noted examples of “certain
companies integrating environmental risk throughout the whole
organization,” creating “a real culture shift.”274
C. Australian Interview Findings
Australia has a much more nascent experience of shareholder activism
than the United States,275 but one that is evolving quickly and increasingly
embracing activism with respect to climate change. In our twenty-four
Australian interviews, we asked participants for their views on how
climate-related shareholder proposals were impacting companies, and how
this avenue compared to “behind-the-scenes” corporate-investor
engagement on ESG issues.
In Australia, investors have traditionally preferred to engage privately
with companies, with shareholder proposals (more commonly termed
“resolutions” in Australia) seen as a more extreme approach, which was the
purview of activist organizations.276 While private engagement remains a
major avenue for company-investor dialogue, paralleling the United States,
there has been a steady increase over the last decade in the number of
resolutions brought to Australian companies addressing ESG issues, and, in
particular, a more recent surge in resolutions addressing climate change
specifically. The latter have been directed mostly at energy sector
companies, including large electricity retailers such as Origin Energy and
AGL, resource companies and large coal miners such as Whitehaven Coal,
Rio Tinto, and BHP, and financiers and insurers with significant exposure
to fossil fuel investments such as ANZ, Westpac, NAB, and QBE.277 Three
general trends are discernable: (1) generalist institutional investors
becoming involved in co-filing resolutions with civil society groups; (2) an
increasing sophistication of the substantive demands made in resolutions
related to climate risks, for instance, to address disclosure of transition
planning or lobbying that is inconsistent with Paris temperature goals; and
(3) resolutions receiving a higher percentage of the shareholder vote at
companies’ annual general meetings (AGMs).278
273
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277
See generally AUSTRALASIAN CTR. FOR CORP. RESP., supra note 98.
278
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Investors Under Scrutiny over Climate Change, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/de4
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The legal framework for shareholder resolutions in Australia has notable
differences from that of the United States, with more constraints on the use
of non-binding, advisory resolutions. As discussed above, however, recent
developments in U.S. practice to limit ESG and climate-related shareholder
proposals may result in more convergence in the future. To bring an
“ordinary resolution” to a company’s AGM in Australia, shareholders
require a minimum of 5% of the votes or a group of at least 100
shareholders.279 This threshold would be prohibitively high in the United
States but has not proved to be the main barrier to shareholder resolutions in
Australia. Rather, companies have declined to put these resolutions to the
AGM on the basis that they unduly interfere in the board’s management
powers.280 This interpretation was upheld by Australia’s Federal Court in a
test case concerning climate change resolutions put to the AGM of the
Commonwealth Bank of Australia.281 As a result of this restriction, more
recent shareholder resolutions on climate change have been brought in two
parts, with a first resolution seeking to amend the company’s constitution to
permit non-binding advisory resolutions, and a second resolution presenting
the substantive demands regarding the board’s management of climate
change risks.282 While constitutional amendments require a 75% majority
vote283 and are therefore highly unlikely to pass, the advantage of this
strategy is that the board is required to put the resolution to the AGM. In

season); see also FIONA DEUTSCH, DANIEL GOCHER & ACCR STAFF, TWO STEPS FORWARD, ONE STEP
BACK: HOW AUSTRALIA’S LARGEST SUPER FUNDS VOTED ON SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS 2017–2019
(2020), https://www.accr.org.au/research/two_steps_forward/ (reporting the proxy voting records of
Australia’s fifty largest superfunds).
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249F) or demand a motion be put to a members’ meeting (s 249N) if the subject is a matter exclusively
within the purview of the board. See generally Michael Jefferies, The Third Wave of Shareholder
Influence and the Emergence of Informational Activism in Australia, 34 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 305 (2019)
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(2015) 325 ALR 736; upheld on appeal in Australasian Ctr. for Corp. Resp. v Commonwealth Bank of
Austl. (2016) 248 FCR 280.
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https://www.asx.com.au/asxpdf/20200320/pdf/44g80mllwk205l.pdf.
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most cases, companies have also allowed a vote on the substantive element
of the resolution and reported this vote publicly.284
Our interviews with Australia participants indicated a shifting attitude
to shareholder engagement on climate issues, with “investors . . . much more
willing to use every tool available to them in the toolkit,”285 including
resolutions and potentially also the divestment of shares if companies are
unresponsive. When large institutional investors—often pension (or
“superannuation”) funds in an Australian context—were involved in
shareholder resolutions, this was often seen as a strategy to escalate
engagement with a company that was failing to adequately respond to
private engagement on climate change.286
Investors voting on climate resolutions in an Australian setting demonstrate
a similar variation of approaches to voting their shares as those in the United
States. Some funds remain committed to more traditional engagement
approaches and would be unlikely to vote against management except in
extreme situations.287 Further, they would be particularly uncomfortable with
supporting constitutional amendments as a way to effect change on climate
risks. Others will assess each case on its merits and then make a decision to
engage behind-the-scenes on the resolution or to vote in a certain way.288
Some Australian funds, notably superannuation funds such as Local
Government Super, have even taken the lead in co-filing climate resolutions.289
Several funds also noted that their approach to voting shares differs between
jurisdictions: in Australia, where they perceive good access to boards and a
strong engagement culture, these funds are more likely to vote with management
and not support a resolution, even though they may vote in favor of an almost
identical resolution in other jurisdictions such as the United States.290
284
In 2020, some climate change resolutions received new levels of support, e.g., resolutions on
Paris goals and targets put at Santos (43.49%) and Woodside’s (50.16%) AGMs. Australian ESG
Shareholder Resolutions, supra note 97. See also Angela Macdonald-Smith, Woodside to Face Grilling
on Climate Action, AUSTL. FIN. REV. (Apr. 27, 2020, 12:00 AM), https://www.afr.com/companies/energy/
woodside-to-face-grilling-on-climate-action-20200424-p54n0x (with key proxy advisor, CGI Glass
Lewis, going against the board and voicing support for resolutions at Woodside); Attracta Mooney &
Patrick Temple-West, Climate Change: Asset Managers Join Forces with the Eco-Warriors, FIN. TIMES
(July 26, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/78167e0b-fdc5-461b-9d95-d8e068971364 (noting the results of
Santos’ shareholder vote).
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Interview with AUS2 (Apr. 26, 2018); Interview with AUS24 (May 17, 2018).
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Regarding the question of whether shareholder engagement, and
particularly the use of shareholder resolutions, helps shift corporate behavior
on climate change, our Australian interview findings revealed a similar
divide to that among U.S. interviewees. On the investor and civil society
side, interviewees expressed optimism that recent shareholder resolutions
had produced tangible changes in the approaches taken by target companies
to climate risks. But they emphasized that these changes were occurring in
the context of ongoing private engagement and also emerging targeted
climate change engagements being pursued by coalitions of investors, such
as Climate Action 100+.291 At the same time, the overall response of
Australian companies to the lodging of shareholder resolutions on climate
change was described as generally defensive, often quite adversarial or
dismissive.292 From the company side, participants did however report a shift
in their approach to climate-related resolutions, including increased
emphasis on engagement with investors on climate risk.293 Various factors
affected the nature of the company’s response, such as whether resolutions
had broader investor backing and the level of support for the resolution.294
As one interviewee expressed it, echoing a similar sentiment seen in the
United States, “even . . . five percent of shareholders voting against
management is significant . . . when you start getting up around that ten to
fifteen percent mark, things get very serious for a board.”295
These findings suggest the Australian experience of shareholder
engagement on climate change is largely tracking that in the United States
even though the use of climate-related shareholder resolutions is a more
recent phenomenon there. This is despite the significant legal constraints on
the filing of ordinary shareholder resolutions in Australia. Indeed, these
constraints seem to have spurred experimentation in Australia with
shareholder resolutions that may offer useful lessons for U.S. practice. This
includes more sophisticated substantive demands, such as efforts to expose
whether companies’ lobbying strategies are consistent with Paris Agreement
291
Interview with AUS3 (Jan. 13, 2018); Interview with AUS4 (Mar. 7, 2018); Interview with
AUS5 (Mar. 2, 2018); Interview with AUS6 (Mar. 22, 2018); Interview with AUS7 (Feb. 23, 2018);
Interview with AUS8 (Mar. 15, 2018). Climate Action 100+ is an engagement initiative launched in 2017
backed by 450 investors with nearly USD $40 trillion in assets under management. It is delivering a fiveyear program of engagement with important greenhouse gas emitters and other companies highly
exposed to climate risk across the global economy that have significant opportunities to drive the clean
energy transition. Investors are calling on companies to improve governance on climate change, curb
emissions and strengthen climate-related financial disclosures by implementing the recommendations of
the TCFD. About Us (2020), CLIMATE ACTION 100+, https://climateaction100.wordpress.com/about-us/.
292
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Interview with AUS23 (Apr. 26, 2018).
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temperature goals. The Australian experience also demonstrates the
potential effectiveness of more informal company-investor engagement
strategies in advancing companies’ responses to climate risk where climate
change is an issue of concern for investors. This kind of engagement has
been facilitated in Australia by the concentrated shareholding of large
institutional investors, such as superannuation funds, in the ASX200.296
Potentially, the United States may be moving in a similar direction with the
growing influence of the “Big Three” and their preference for using
engagement over shareholder proposals.
IV. FIDUCIARY DUTY
The final legal tool considered in this Article focuses on the fiduciary
duties of directors and officers. Directors and officers have a duty to act
loyally on behalf of their corporation.297 Some have advocated suing boards
that have failed to adequately monitor and manage risks arising from climate
change. Such suits aim to encourage a faster energy transition by causing
companies to shift resources from dirtier to cleaner operations.298 To date,
no cases seeking to enforce such a duty in a climate change context have
been brought in the United States, but there has been discussion both here
and more extensively in other countries, such as Australia, about the
possibility of such suits.299 Even without such suits, many companies have
revised their risk management practices to recognize climate change risks.
This Part explores the law surrounding monitoring of climate change risk
and how corporate practice has developed.
A. Legal and Institutional Developments
There is some concern that the duty of loyalty could inhibit
consideration of sustainability matters like climate change because the duty
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requires maximizing financial returns to shareholders.300 However,
addressing climate change often improves the long-term profitability of
companies,301 and given the broad discretion granted by the business
judgment rule, directors need not fear liability for addressing climate change
as long as they plausibly link the issue to long-term profitability.302
There is a more affirmative potential use of fiduciary duty. Suits
enforcing this duty could become part of a new wave of climate change
litigation. An early wave of litigation focused mostly on claims based in tort
and environmental law.303 A second wave of litigation is focused on federal
and state securities law claims, arguing to false and misleading disclosure
by companies (mostly energy companies) that allegedly were well aware of
the risks to their business models of climate change.304
Our focus here is on a potential new wave of litigation based on state
corporate law fiduciary duty. In 1996, the Delaware Chancery Court held
that directors have “a duty to attempt in good faith to assure that a corporate
information and reporting system, which the board concludes is adequate,
exists.”305 Some argue that given the significant risks that climate change
poses to the business of many corporations, this Caremark duty creates a
risk of liability for the boards of such corporations should they fail to
adequately monitor and respond to those risks. 306
Any such suit would confront serious obstacles. Liability under
Caremark is extremely unlikely. The Caremark Court called it “possibly the
most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope
to win a judgment.”307 The court said that “only a sustained or systematic
failure of the board to exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt
to assure a reasonable information and reporting system exists—will
establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to liability.”308
In over two decades since Caremark was decided, only a few cases have
even survived motions to dismiss.309
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But two recent cases have increased the odds of success of a Caremark
claim. In upholding Caremark, the Delaware Supreme Court specified two
ways in which plaintiffs could claim oversight liability: “(a) the directors
utterly failed to implement any reporting or information system or controls;
or (b) having implemented such a system or controls, consciously failed to
monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from being
informed of risks or problems requiring their attention.”310 For each of these
two paths, plaintiffs have recently survived a motion to dismiss.
In Marchand v. Barnhill, the Delaware Supreme Court overturned a
Chancery Court dismissal of a suit against Blue Bell Creameries.311 After a
listeria outbreak caused by Blue Bell’s ice cream, the court found the
complaint adequately alleged the company had no monitoring system at all.
The lack of a food safety monitoring system in a regulated company that
only produces ice cream was critical to the court.312 In re Clovis Oncology,
Inc. Derivative Litigation involved a drug clinical trial by a
biopharmaceutical company. 313 Here there was a monitoring system, but the
board allegedly ignored numerous facts that raised red flags showing that
the trial failed to follow standard protocol and regulations.314
Though these cases indicate some life within Caremark, potential
plaintiffs cannot take too much comfort. They only involve motions to
dismiss, and the courts emphasize the importance of the fact that the
companies had just one product line in a highly regulated industry, so that
compliance with those regulations was central to the business.
Even more important for the prospect of climate claims, Caremark
involved legal compliance oversight, as did those few cases which have
allowed Caremark claims to continue. Plaintiffs have tried to extend
Caremark to monitoring business risk. The Delaware courts have never
accepted this extension, and their comments suggest great skepticism.315
Some think this limitation to legal compliance is the appropriate function of
Caremark.316 Others argue that monitoring business risk is functionally very
similar to compliance risk, so that Caremark could apply to business risk as
well,317 and some argue that Caremark liability should apply where boards
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fail to supervise risks that impose serious social harms.318 But case law does
not extend beyond extreme legal compliance oversight failures.
Thus, if a plaintiff claims that a company broke a law related to climate
change and the board failed to adequately monitor compliance with that law,
Caremark and its progeny offer some limited hope, particularly if climate
risk is truly central to the company’s business model and it either had no
legal compliance system in place at all or the board ignored major red flags.
But if the claim is that the board ignored risks that climate change poses to
financial performance, a Caremark suit seems doomed to fail, absent major
change in the case law.
Even if the risk of legal liability is negligible, a threatened Caremark
suit could still affect director behavior. Companies may choose to have
aggressive compliance programs to avoid any chance of liability given legal
uncertainty.319 Regulators encourage companies to have robust compliance
programs.320 Reputational concerns may also encourage companies to go
beyond the minimum required to avoid Caremark liability.321
Oversight duty suits may have a greater chance of success in other
countries. We discuss the situation in Australia below.322 In Poland,
ClientEarth sued (as a shareholder) two energy companies, Enea and Energa,
over construction of a new coal-fired power plant, claiming that the project
posed unjustifiable financial risks in the context of rising carbon prices,
increased competition from cheaper renewables, and the impact of EU
energy reforms on state subsidies for coal power.323 A District Court held in
ClientEarth’s favor, although on other grounds.324 In the United Kingdom,
ClientEarth has written to fourteen pension funds asking them to disclose
what steps they are taking on climate risk and threatening legal action if
those steps are not sufficient.325 A prominent Canadian law professor argues
that Canadian law imposes a duty on companies to monitor climate change
risks.326 This may be an area where Delaware is less responsive to
shareholders than courts in other countries.
318
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Even without legally binding obligations, boards monitor business risks,
and best practices have evolved rapidly. A widely cited comprehensive
approach is the COSO Enterprise Risk Management Framework. COSO
issued guidance for a framework on enterprise risk management in 2004,
which was updated in 2017.327 In 2018, COSO and the World Business
Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) issued guidance on how
the COSO framework applies to ESG risks.328 The guidance stresses that
ESG matters pose financial risks to companies in the short, medium, and
long term and that this understanding brings ESG risks within mainstream
risk management processes.329 The guidance stresses collaboration between
the board, executive management, and sustainability practitioners, as well as
internal and external communication of ESG risks.330
Ceres has recently issued guidance on board oversight of ESG issues.331
This also recommends stakeholder and shareholder input,332 regular board
discussion of ESG risks and integration into strategic planning,333
incorporating ESG factors into executive compensation,334 and building
ESG factors into both audit committee and other relevant board committee
processes.335 Still, not all boards follow best practices. A 2019 PwC survey
of corporate directors found that 56% (up from 29% in 2018) of directors
say shareholders are too focused on environmental and sustainability
issues,336 and 46% think climate change should either have limited or no
impact on company strategy.337
At both the board and management levels, a critical question is who has
responsibility for monitoring ESG risks. The full board has some
responsibility, but there is a need to have more focus at the board committee
level as well. The audit committee is responsible for overall risk monitoring,
but should it be primarily responsible for ESG risks, or should another
committee be charged with that? Large corporations increasingly have
sustainability teams. Should management-level responsibility be primarily
with them, and to whom should they report? What role do other departments
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such as compliance, legal, and audit play? There is a tradeoff. Giving
responsibility to a specialized group will ensure someone has expertise and
incentive to pay attention to climate change. But there is a risk of becoming
siloed, leaving central decisionmakers out of touch. The COSO and WBCSD
and Ceres guidances suggest some specialization but also much coordination
between various departments, committees, and levels.338
B. U.S. Interview Findings
In our interviews with the fourteen U.S. participants, we asked several
open-ended questions concerning fiduciary duty and risk oversight and
management related to climate change. These included how climate change
issues filter up to the board; the lines of communication and processes in
place around climate change; whether independent advice is sought, and, if
so, from whom and how; and whether they perceived a widespread
understanding among U.S. directors about how fiduciary duties apply to
climate change. We describe here some of the patterns that emerged in the
participants’ answers.
Although directors and officers are very much aware of the duty to
oversee and manage corporate risk, the understanding of the role of climate
risks within that duty is mixed. Investors tend to view the duty as
encompassing climate risks, but when engaging with companies do not
“hang their hat on the fiduciary duty piece.”339 Perceptions also vary by
industry, which to some extent is appropriate. A securities lawyer thus noted:
If you are an energy company it is very different. You
probably have this fully integrated in your business and in your
thinking. You just have to. But I think for the bulk of our
clients that are in the manufacturing space it is still not. Margin
is still more important than climate change.340
Another interviewee, who is a pension fund activist, generally concurred
with this view, commenting:
A lot of boards are just trying to fend off a hedge fund or other
short-term thinking which kind of contradicts any long-term
planning that they would do. It’s another big elephant in the
room. Unless the company is managing and thinking about the
long-term, this kind of stuff doesn’t make sense to them.341
For those companies addressing climate risk, our interview findings
revealed a great deal of variation in how companies allocate responsibility
for that risk, and ESG risk more generally. Some examples give a sense of
338
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the range of options. At a retail company, the board’s nomination and
governance committee is responsible for corporate social responsibility
issues, and there is a CSR management team.342 At a food company, a public
responsibility committee handles reputational risk related to sustainability,
there is a sustainability group, and a governance committee of top managers
discusses risks of all types.343 Another company has a matrixed reporting
environment, where the sustainability group reports to finance and legal, and
sometimes to the board as well.344 At another company there are two
sustainability teams and a sustainability executive advisory team.345 At an
energy company, both the audit committee and an operations,
environmental, and safety committee oversee ESG risk.346
Beyond internal company structures, a number of participants discussed
outreach to various stakeholders other than shareholders on a regular basis
on ESG and climate issues. At a food company, one participant commented:
[W]e’re engaged with quite a few NGOs, but campaigning
NGOs like Greenpeace as well as operational NGOs like The
Nature Conservancy or World Wildlife Fund or the Xerxes
Society, who are actually doing things on the ground . . . . We
talk to anybody who wants to talk to us about these issues, and
in some cases we rely on their technical expertise.347
An energy company director noted his company has an annual stakeholder
meeting that is large and comprehensive, with the CEO attending.348
As in the case of shareholder engagement,349 a number of interviewees
discussed the emerging focus on having board expertise around climate or
more general environmental issues. A participant who works as a consultant
described this as “a growing trend.”350 A question is what counts as
environmental expertise, with “a lot of reinterpreting people’s experience in
that space.”351 As a mutual fund manager participant remarked, “It doesn’t
have to be an environmental scientist that you’re sticking on a board, that
has no relevant experience, but someone who just has a real appreciation for
this kind of broader risk.”352 A securities lawyer noted that this kind of
experience may slowly grow across companies over time, with a “ripple
effect”353 as “you get the board members having been people who were part
342
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of an executive team that was spending more time on that.”354 One lawyer
also noted that “some companies are starting to pay attention to how
compensation affects the incentives to pay attention to ESG matters.”355
No duty to monitor climate change risk suits have yet been brought in
the United States, so they were not yet on the radar screen for most of our
participants as a factor that might drive shifts in corporate behavior around
climate change. However, several participants remarked that such a suit, if
it were to emerge, would get a company’s attention. As one participant
noted, in the litigious U.S. market, “the risk of a lawsuit gets everyone’s
attention in a way that I think can trump anything else in terms of focus.”356
C. Australian Interview Findings
Directors’ duties under Australian corporate law are of similar content
to fiduciary duties under Delaware law, although broader interpretations,
and a “public interest” orientation of enforcement in Australia, potentially
enhance the prospects of a successful lawsuit.357 The principal duties
considered most likely to be a basis for finding liability in a climate change
context are the duty of due care and diligence, and duties related to the
disclosure of business risks.358 In our interviews with Australian
participants, we asked them for their views of whether companies see such
duties as extending to climate risks, and what response was being taken by
directors, if any, as a result. The following sections first explain the relevant
duties that apply under Australian corporate law and then highlight key
findings from the interviews about how these duties are being interpreted by
Australian companies in practice.
For the duty of due care and diligence, under Australian law, directors
must show they exercised the degree of care and diligence that a reasonable
354
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person in their circumstances would exercise.359 As in the United States,
directors can raise a defense of “business judgment.” However, this operates
only in relatively narrow circumstances where directors can show, inter alia,
that they “inform[ed] themselves about the subject matter of the judgment
to the extent they reasonably believe[d] to be appropriate; and . . . rationally
believe[d] that the judgment was in the best interests of the corporation.”360
This imposes a relatively high threshold for invocation of the business
judgment rule compared to the United States.361
Although Australia, like the United States, has not yet seen a climate change
breach of duty suit against company directors, there has been extensive
consideration of this possibility in two legal opinions from leading commercial
law advocates commissioned by the NGO, the Centre for Policy Development.
In these opinions, Noel Hutley SC and barrister Sebastian Hartford Davis
outlined how the duty of due care and diligence would apply to climate change
based on existing statutory law and case law interpretations.362 They concluded
that, as a general matter, there is ample evidence that climate change is likely to
pose potentially foreseeable harm to company interests in many situations.363
As a result they advised, at a minimum:
[D]irectors should consider and, if it seems appropriate, take
steps to inform themselves about climate-related risks to their
business, when and how those risks might materialize, whether
they will impact the business adversely or favorably, whether
there is anything to be done to alter the risk, and otherwise to
consider how the consequences of the risk can be met. In
complex situations . . . a director is permitted to and should
seek out expert or professional advice pursuant to s189 of [the
Corporations] Act.364
The Hutley/Hartford Davis opinions have been described by ASIC (the
Australian equivalent of the SEC) as “legally sound and . . . reflective of our
understanding of the position under the prevailing case law in Australia in
so far as directors’ duties are concerned,”365 thus amplifying their influence.
Speaking at a climate roundtable in late 2019, former Justice of the High
Court and Royal Commissioner Kenneth Hayne AC QC concluded: “in
Australia, a director acting in the best interests of the company must take
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account of, and the board must report publicly on, climate-related risks and
issues relevant to the entity.”366
Further, commentators, such as MinterEllison lawyer Sarah Barker,
have discussed specific circumstances where directors may be in breach of
the duty of care and diligence in relation to climate risk.367 These include
situations where there is either “[a] total failure to consider and govern for
climate change risks in strategic planning and risk management,” or
“[i]nadequate or deficient consideration and/or governance of climate
change-related risk exposures.”368 Hutley and Hartford Davis themselves
described the prospect of “litigation against a director who has failed to
perceive, disclose or take steps in relation to a foreseeable climate-related
risk that can be demonstrated to have caused harm to a company (including,
perhaps, reputational harm)” as “likely to be only a matter of time.”369
Such liability theories have been tested in the recently settled case
against the REST superannuation fund, which alleged that the fund’s
corporate trustee failed to act with care, skill, and diligence, and in the best
interests of beneficiaries by not adequately considering the risks posed by
climate change to the fund’s investment portfolio in the best interests of its
members.370 While the REST case did not concern directors’ duties under
corporate law, it tested the scope of similar trustees’ duties under prudential
laws applicable to superannuation funds.371 In an initial procedural ruling in
the case delivered by Justice Perram of the Australian Federal Court, his
Honor determined that it was legitimate to characterize the litigation as a
public interest suit as “[t]he case appear[ed] to raise a socially significant
issue about the role of superannuation trusts and trustees in the current public
366
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In thinking about how the Australian duty of care might develop to promote action by directors
to deal with climate change, a member of our Expert Reference Group for this research—Professor Ian
Ramsay of Melbourne Law School—noted that the development of so-called “stepping stones” liability
might possibly provide a pathway. There is now a series of judgments by Australian courts where
directors have been held to breach their duty of care by allowing the company to breach the Corporations
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controversy about climate change.”372 The case settled on the eve of trial
with REST acknowledging that “[c]limate change is a material, direct and
current financial risk to the superannuation fund…Rest, as a superannuation
trustee, considers that it is important to actively identify and manage these
issues,” as well as committing to net zero by 2050 and reporting against
the TCFD framework.373
More recently, a law student—Kathleen O’Donnell—has commenced
proceedings against the Australian Government for failure to disclose
climate-related risks to investors in Australian government bonds.374 She
alleges that the Commonwealth engaged in misleading and deceptive
conduct, and that government officials breached their duty of care and
diligence by failing to disclose any information about Australia’s climate
change risks in key information documents for investors.375 The claim
alleges that Australia’s financial position and the investment performance of
its bonds may be affected by climate change risks,376 and that these ought to
be disclosed.377 The case does not break entirely new ground,378 but it is the
first to focus on the Government’s obligations in relation to sovereign bonds.
Our findings from interviews with Australian participants suggested that
growing discussion of directors’ duties and climate change—particularly
through the Hutley/Hartford Davis opinions—has helped shift norms in this
area such that the conclusion that duties apply to climate risks is now largely
considered uncontroversial.379 As one interviewee described it, these
developments are leading to “a slow broadening [of] understanding of what
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those duties and expectations are, and how current law would be applied if
it was . . . tested.”380
Despite growing understanding of the links between directors’ duties
and climate risks, our interviews showed that actual practice within
companies remains highly variable. Whereas directors of large listed
companies—especially those in sectors where climate risks are perceived to
be material in the immediate and near term—are increasingly likely to be
well-informed and active on climate change, the same cannot be said of the
broader directorship of Australian companies, particularly for those
companies where climate risks are perceived as more remote.381 Participants
also expressed the opinion that skepticism of climate science remains a
prevalent attitude on boards of ASX100 companies.382
When responding to questions on directors’ duties and climate change,
many participants reflected on the longer-running debate over corporate
purpose and the relevance of stakeholder interests versus those of
shareholders discussed above.383 They noted the challenges for Australian
company directors in moving beyond a focus on short-term
shareholder-related interests and the tendency for directors to view climate
change as a long-term concern, rather than a materially actionable risk to
company interests in the near term.384
For those companies that are considering climate risk, the way that this
consideration is integrated into broader governance processes varies
considerably, echoing some of the diversity seen in the United States.
Company-side interviewees provide various examples of governance
processes for ensuring board oversight of climate risks, including risk
management governance processes, such as regular materiality assessments
and reporting to the board by risk and audit committees,385 or sustainability
committees providing regular analysis of climate risks to the board and
developing company policy and position statements on these issues for
board endorsement.386 Some companies have also developed formal
processes for the board to obtain external perspectives on climate risk. This
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may include appointing expert climate change advisors or meeting regularly
with civil society leaders for input on emerging risks and responses.387
Overall, the picture that emerged from the Australian interviews was one
of growing understanding of the links between climate change and directors’
duties, prompting some new processes and consideration of climate risks,
particularly by large, risk-exposed companies, but not yet causing a wider
corporate behavioral shift. As in the United States, though, the potential for
litigation—and personal liability for directors found in breach of relevant
duties—was seen as a potential gamechanger. The general perception was
that if, and when, litigation, regulatory investigation, or shareholder reaction
around potential breach of duty to manage climate risks does emerge, the
pressure on directors to ensure they are fulfilling their legal obligations in
this area will heighten considerably.388 Given the broader interpretations of
relevant duties and the widespread acceptance and high profile of these
interpretations, Australia is a likely jurisdiction for the emergence of climate
change breach of duty suits and a potential testing ground for their feasibility
elsewhere, including in the United States.
V. FUTURE POSSIBILITIES
In this Part, we suggest legal reforms that could make each of the three
corporate and financial tools more effective in driving behavioral change.
These suggestions draw upon experiences with use of those tools to date
and interviewees’ reflections upon them. In Section A, we provide a
general framework for potential legal reforms. Then in Sections B through
D we apply that framework to disclosure, shareholder engagement, and
fiduciary duty, respectively.
A. Framework for Reform
The introduction outlined the varying positions that corporate
governance and environmental law scholars take towards the role of
non-shareholder interests in corporations. The middle-ground approach that
guides most corporate climate activism accepts shareholder primacy, but
argues that the long-term profitability of many corporations is increasingly
impacted by climate change, so that tools focused on shareholder interests
can be effectively used.389 Critics from one side argue that climate change
does not yet matter enough within the time horizon of stock markets;
corporations focused on profitability therefore are not promising targets for
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climate change activists, so we should focus on other forms of regulation.390
Critics from another side argue that, as currently constructed, corporations
are indeed unlikely to respond effectively to climate change, but corporate
law should be reconstructed to require corporations to consider the public
interest in addressing the issue.391
The analysis of Parts II through IV, drawing on our interviews, provides
support for each position. Those skeptical about the ability of corporations
to address climate change can point to the lack of clear progress in changing
corporate behavior despite the great attention being paid to disclosure and
shareholder engagement.392 We see a central truth here: activists should not
fool themselves about the potential for these corporate governance tools to
save the day. Other forms of regulation are much more important. For-profit
corporations are not designed to solve a long-term, planet-wide, collective
action problem like climate change.
Those advocating for deep reform of corporate law can flip the script on
what to infer from the limited results of corporation-focused activism. Given
the ongoing failure of governments to seriously respond to climate change,
the urgency of addressing climate change, and the central role that
corporations play in the economy, if corporations as currently constituted
are not up to the task, we need to reconstitute them.
Those advocating the middle path of working within corporations under
current law and institutions can argue that our results are not so definitive
and dire. The disclosure and engagement initiatives described here are still
new. Even now there are glimmerings of changed behavior, and many investors
told us that as disclosure and proposals become more sophisticated and
widespread and have time to take root, we can expect to see more change.393
We have much sympathy for the stakeholder approach. The limitations
of existing corporations and corporate law are great, and the need for drastic,
fast responses to the threat to our climate is greater. In our discussion below
for each of the three legal tools, we will begin by sketching how corporate
or securities law would respond if we adopted an aggressive, legally binding
stakeholder theory of the corporation. If environmental law does not
transform soon, it may be that anything short of such a fundamental shift in
corporations will be inadequate to our situation.
And yet that fundamental shift in corporations and corporate law is
unlikely to occur. So, we fall back on proposals that build upon existing
corporate and securities law and initiatives as described in Parts II through
IV. We suggest ways that these can be strengthened. These more pragmatic
proposals will have less effect than adopting the stakeholder-focused
proposals, but they are more feasible. Still, the stakeholder proposals are not
390
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merely a dream: they help shape our more pragmatic proposals, so that our
suggestions push the shareholder-focused approach closer to the stakeholder
view of the world.
Throughout this analysis, we consider how U.S. strategies might learn
from the Australian experience. Because the jurisdictions have fundamental
similarities, even with differences in the details of law and implementation,
there are possibilities for the U.S. approach to borrow from the most
effective Australian strategies.
B. Disclosure
Current initiatives have modestly increased disclosure in mandatory
securities filings and greatly increased the use of voluntary sustainability
reports.394 Much work has been done to devise reporting frameworks,395 but
the lack of a common framework in the United States makes reports hard to
compare, and the voluntary nature of most reporting leads to vagueness and
cherry-picking of positive news.396 Australia, in this respect, provides an
interesting model for the United States because of its more consistent use of
one standard for disclosure.397
These weaknesses, as well as the siloing of voluntary disclosure from
the securities disclosure process that involves more central decisionmakers
and formal audit and oversight, keep disclosure from having the effect on
operations that it could in the United States.398 The time has come for
strengthened required disclosure.
An aggressive U.S. stakeholder-focused disclosure initiative would
focus on a range of ESG issues, not just climate change. Investors,
customers, and employees are currently focusing on a wide range of ESG
issues, and many of the voluntary initiatives, like GRI and SASB, cover
issues beyond climate change.399 A coalition of groups on a range of issues
would be more likely to prevail politically. At least portions of the disclosure
requirements would need to be rules rather than standards, both to ensure
greater comparability across companies and to make it harder to greenwash.
Disclosure could occur in separate sustainability reports rather than
securities documents, but would be subject to similar anti-fraud rules, both
increasing the accuracy of the disclosure and forcing companies to devote
greater and higher-level attention to collecting the information.400 The
materiality of what information needs to be disclosed would be judged by
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more than the effect on financial performance.401 Such an approach would
echo reforms being pursued in the EU through the elaboration of guidelines
under its Non-Financial Reporting Directive.
An important element of climate disclosure would discuss the impact of
how a concerted effort to respond to climate change would affect the
disclosing company. The two-degree scenario analysis of TCFD and many
shareholder proposals in Australia and the United States points the way, as
does the recent French law requiring companies to disclose how their
company would contribute to meeting GHG emissions and clean energy
targets set in the law.402 However, early TCFD analyses by Australian
companies still tend to self-select favorable scenarios on which to report.403
Such a requirement would need to be created by legislation, a major
obstacle in deadlocked U.S. politics. It would also require the creation of a
new administrative agency to implement and enforce the required
disclosure.404 Corporate opposition would likely be strong, and the prospects
of passing such legislation do not appear great. There are also considerable
potential costs. Precise disclosure rules are difficult to create for many ESG
topics, and what topics really matter may vary significantly over time, with
the legal disclosure framework not reacting quickly. Thus, even if a
stakeholder-focused system of ESG disclosures were politically feasible, its
desirability would be debatable.
A more modest approach working within existing securities law would
be more feasible and less risky. If new disclosure rules can be crafted within
the authority of existing statutes, then all that would be required is action by
the SEC. Several options are possible within existing securities law.
Most modestly, the SEC could provide greater guidance as to how
climate change fits within current disclosure requirements. The SEC
provided some guidance in 2010,405 but that could be updated and expanded.
For instance, it could suggest that companies describe risks related to what
Michael Vanderbergh calls “private environmental governance”—e.g.,
when Walmart commits to reducing carbon emissions in the products it sells,
its suppliers with high emissions face a potentially serious reduction in
demand for their products.406 Tied to such guidance, the SEC could engage
401
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in stricter oversight of how well companies follow the guidance. Australian
regulators appear to be moving in this direction, having tentatively embraced
the TCFD as a model for companies to disclose climate risks and recently
advising regulated entities that they will scale up monitoring of climate
disclosures.407 There is also the potential for greater regulatory guidance
from Australian accounting standards bodies regarding how to integrate and
quantify climate risks within financial statements.408 These steps provide
important models for the United States to consider in its reform efforts.
More aggressive is the sustainability discussion and analysis
requirement proposed by Jill Fisch.409 This would require a narrative
analysis of the three most significant sustainability risks that a company
faces.410 Climate change would not be a top-three risk for all companies, but
it would be for the companies that most significantly contribute to, and are
affected by, climate change. The sustainability discussion is a standard
rather than a rule and so would not help comparability as much as more
detailed rules, but Fisch argues many common practices would emerge and
help with comparability.411
The most aggressive option would impose a new, more detailed set of
rules for climate change and other ESG topics.412 Since it would be part of
securities law, only information that is material to financial performance
would be required, reducing costs of compliance. We suggest a “comply or
explain” approach: companies that feel portions of the new required
disclosure are not relevant to them could choose not to comply and explain
why.413 This creates more flexibility and diminishes the risk of ill-considered
rules creating high costs, though it would increase the risk of
under-disclosure. The SEC could devise new rules from scratch, but the
better option would be to adapt, at least as a starting point, one of the current
voluntary disclosure frameworks.414 The rulemaking process would be a
good way to sort out which framework investors prefer.
407
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It is currently hard to say which of several alternatives is likely to win
out.415 We suspect that SASB is the best option.416 It is adapted for
securities-based disclosure, covers a wide range of ESG topics, and provides
detailed, industry-specific rules. A downside of SASB, though, would be
that it currently has less support outside the United States than some
alternatives. As noted, Australia focuses on the TCFD.417
Such a broad rules-based disclosure system would give investors the
comparability they crave and reduce the tendency for vague, optimistic
greenwashing. The “comply or explain” feature could lessen company
opposition. Some companies might even support such disclosure, since the
current proliferation of standards and information requests creates a
dilemma for well-intentioned companies. New rules would provide one
common framework and a level playing field. Though shareholder-focused,
the disclosure would be useful for others as well.
C. Shareholder Proposals and Engagement
Both formal and informal shareholder engagement have increased
greatly, with climate change a major element of that growth.418 It is not clear
that this engagement has yet had a major impact on operations. But there are
signs of positive effects, and as engagement takes root and becomes more
sophisticated, its impact could grow.419
An aggressive stakeholder approach to governance and voting might
further enable shareholder voice, given the current use of such voice to
promote ESG issues. Or it might not, given the potential use of expanded
shareholder voice by hedge fund activists seeking short-term profits.420 What
a stakeholder approach would distinctively do is give more voice to
stakeholders, including persons or groups with environmental expertise. A
direct voice in making decisions could have much more impact than
disclosure or fiduciary duties.421
The most extensive approach to greater voice would be positions on the
board of directors. Senator Elizabeth Warren, for example, has proposed that
40% of the directors on the boards of the largest corporations be elected by
their employees,422 which, due to her presidential campaign in 2020, has
brought greater public attention to this issue. The case for board
representation of environmentalists is weaker than for employees.
415
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Environmentalists have a less intense stake in the operations of a
corporation, and there is serious question as to who would have power to
vote for such a representative.423 But one could certainly imagine taking the
environmental expertise proposals that are beginning to appear and turning
them into a legal requirement.
A lesser degree of voice would take the form of advisory councils. These
would have no binding vote over decisions but would be regularly consulted
by the board or officers on issues within their expertise. One could imagine
either a general sustainability council with representatives of various interests, or
different councils for different interests, with one focused on the environment.424
Mandatory stakeholder voice mechanisms might have the strongest
effects of any of the possible reforms considered here, but they would also
create the greatest change in corporate structure, provoke the greatest
opposition, and impose the highest costs. They would require legislation,
making them hard to achieve.
Working instead within the current corporate legal structure turns our
attention to shareholder, not stakeholder, voice. Institutional investors have
evolved to a point where shareholder voice may plausibly reflect
(imperfectly) many stakeholder concerns, including climate change. Funds
with a sustainability focus, along with individual investors concerned about
such issues, are raising climate change repeatedly in both proposals and
informal engagement. The big universal asset managers like BlackRock and
Vanguard, with long-term stakes and broad portfolios, plausibly represent
the public interest (imperfectly) in voting on those proposals, which
determines whether they will pass. There are plenty of problems in the
incentives and information facing the managers of such institutions, but they
are enough aligned with public concerns to push for positive changes.425
Several legal issues should be addressed to give more room for
shareholder ESG activism. The ERISA fiduciary duty interpretations that
limit the ability of fund managers to base investment and voting decisions
on climate change concerns should be changed,426 and the new rules further
restricting consideration of ESG in investment and voting should be
repealed, as the Biden administration has moved towards doing by
announcing it will not enforce the new rules.427 Ideally, ERISA could be
interpreted or amended to allow consideration of the non-financial interests
423
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of beneficiaries.428 More feasibly, the seesawing guidance on incorporating
ESG concerns into considerations of financial risk should return to the
Obama-era grant of greater discretion.
On Rule 14a-8 proponent eligibility, we suggest reversing the recent
“reform.” The recent SEC rule change increased the number of shares and
holding period required in order to introduce a shareholder proposal.429 The
old eligibility requirements did not need fixing. Shareholder proposals
impose limited costs and serve a useful function. As several of our
interviewees (even on the corporate side) noted, they provide a useful
function of alerting managers to emerging concerns. Indeed, in this case, the
U.S. approach to non-binding advisory proposals provides a useful legal
model for Australian reforms.430
The recent SEC practice of allowing exclusion of GHG emission
reduction target proposals431 should stop, given the usefulness of such
proposals.432 There is an easy fix. The analysis allowing exclusion has
reasoned that the significant policy exception, which forbids exclusion for
proposals raising significant policy issues, does not apply to the antimicromanagement rationale for the exclusion.433 That should be reversed,434
so that any proposal that addresses a significant policy issue that is genuinely
relevant to the company’s operations should not be excludable under the
ordinary business exclusion.
Finally, the literature surveyed in Section II.B.1, our interviews, and our
idealistic stakeholder vision suggest a few shareholder proposals that seem
particularly worth pursuing:
•

428

Reporting on targets to address climate change in accordance
with a two-degree scenario. These are specific and
action-oriented, with the potential to induce greater operating
changes than older reporting proposals.435
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•

Disclosure of lobbying and political spending. Addressing
climate change ultimately requires major environmental
legislation, and such proposals may reduce some of the
political opposition to such legislation.436

•

Tying executive and director compensation to success in
meeting climate change targets. Executive compensation is a
critical tool for creating incentives to induce desired behavior.437

•

Requiring a director or directors with significant environmental
expertise. Many interviewees identified this as an emerging
issue receiving growing attention, and it is a move in the
direction of a stakeholder approach to governance.438

•

Creating an environmental, or, more broadly, a sustainability
advisory council. Many companies already reach out to a variety
of stakeholders in various ways. An advisory council would
formalize stakeholder engagement, giving it a focus, which
could lead to more sustained attention from executive officers
and the board. We have not seen such a proposal, but it (as well
as the previous two proposals) would be a way of moving
towards our more aggressive stakeholder engagement vision
company by company, rather than by comprehensive legislation.

D. Fiduciary Duty
Emerging best practice in risk management incorporates climate change
into the monitoring of company risk, but many companies do not yet follow
that best practice.439 Caremark-style suits, claiming a failure to adequately
monitor climate change risk, provide a potential path to push more companies
towards better risk management, but such suits face large obstacles.440
A stakeholder-focused duty to monitor would require that boards
address severe risks to significant stakeholders and interests impacted by a
company’s operations. Given the policy reasons underlying the business
judgment rule, such a duty would, like Caremark, give boards very wide
discretion in deciding how to design and carry out such a supervisory
system. But the duty to monitor would go well beyond supervising whether
the company is complying with the law. One of us has suggested such a duty
in the context of financial companies following the financial crisis.441 A
broad stakeholder-focused duty would make sense in the context of
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corporations whose core governance mechanisms reflect the voices of
multiple stakeholders.
Such a duty seems extremely unlikely to be recognized by the Delaware
courts. It greatly stretches Caremark and also reverses the core commitment
to shareholder primacy. That commitment has, if anything, grown stronger
and more explicit in Delaware recently. It is hard to imagine the courts
switching direction anytime soon.442
A more modest approach might be to wait and see if supportive cases
develop in other countries first—the law elsewhere may be more open to
climate change supervision suits than Delaware is.443 Once a plaintiff
decides to test the waters in Delaware, the greatest chance for success would
exist where a company has violated existing law limiting GHG emissions,
or some other climate-related laws. Such a case could then make a traditional
Caremark claim suggesting a failure to monitor legal compliance. Even in
the wake of recent cases allowing such suits to continue, such a claim would
face long odds, but it might have a chance.444 However, focusing only on
cases generated by violations of existing environmental or tort law would be
very limiting—much of the point of the legal tools considered here is to prod
corporations to change even though environmental law does not require it.
Thus, those proposing duty cases based on failure to address climate risk
mostly conceive of climate risk as creating financial risk for a company.
This goes beyond legal compliance risk but is less of a challenge to Delaware
law than the stakeholder conception of risk. Still, such a theory would run
up against the many cases strongly questioning whether the Caremark duty
extends to the monitoring of business risk. But those cases do not quite hold
that the duty to monitor does not extend to business risk, so the point remains
open to argument, even if the chances of success are slim.
To succeed, litigants would need to find a very attractive defendant.
Climate change would need to pose a great and pressing financial risk to the
company, and yet the company would either have to have no system for
monitoring climate risk at all or be completely ignoring obvious and multiple
red flags about such risk. An appropriate situation may be hard to find,
especially given the current lack of regulatory risks posed by environmental
and energy law reforms compared to the European context. Most companies
in the industries most affected by climate risk are now claiming to do at least
something about addressing such risk. It may not be much, but Caremark
does not require much at all. Maybe, though, there is an energy company out
there that publicly engages in climate change denialism; that could make a
promising target.
Over time, Australia may provide some helpful models for an approach
because, as described above, it has a more promising environment for breach
442
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of duty suits against directors. If that happens, its greater similarity to the
United States than the European jurisdictions where the litigation has emerged
to date may suggest pathways for U.S. lawyers working to craft an approach.
CONCLUSION
As explored in Part I,445 in both corporate and environmental law, there
are those who argue for major reform of environmental law and express
skepticism that tools focused on corporate governance can do much good.
Our interview results in Parts II through IV suggest their skepticism has
much justification. They are correct that environmental and energy law
reform would address climate change more effectively. But we are skeptical
about the pace of such reform, and our interviews do suggest that something
can and needs to be done right now, with existing law and forward-looking
corporations and investors, that does not preclude these longer-term efforts.
Even if current approaches in disclosure, stakeholder, and fiduciary duty law
are not yet advancing these goals substantially, we argue that—especially
given the existing political climate—they form an important part of the
regulatory toolkit that should be incorporated into strategic approaches.
This Article therefore includes both major and more limited reform
proposals. We suggest deep changes taking a stakeholder approach, which
could create companies much more willing to address climate change than
current U.S. public corporations. But since significant reform is unlikely to
pass in the near term, we also propose more modest reforms working within
the long-term shareholder value approach underlying most of the activism
we discuss in this Article.446 The reforms that we regard as more realistic do
not promise drastic, immediate change, and such change may well be
required to avoid very serious consequences from climate change.447
As the United States ramps up its ambition to address climate change
under the Biden Administration through rejoining the Paris Agreement,
extensive Executive Orders, and advancing legislation to support major
investments in clean energy infrastructure, corporate and financial
mechanisms are an important complementary tool.448 And helped along by
relatively modest and achievable legal reforms, those efforts have a chance
to have some real effects, if not dramatic ones. Given the long-lasting impact
of GHG emissions, real and soon-achievable effects are worth pursuing as
one part of a multi-prong effort of addressing climate change. Corporate and
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financial law will never be the sole solution to the problem of climate
change, but it shapes the decisions of companies and investors that are
crucial to the level of global GHG emissions and efforts to adapt to impacts.

